Sunday, January 3, 2016

South Africa and the problem of freedom

A lot has been reflected in the South African mediascape lately that has been nothing short of horrific. It’s saddening to note the escalating number of traumas in what is obviously an already overly traumatised country. People are striking to the point of crippling the economy, while others are tearing down statues to the point of crippling any kind of constructive discourse. And, as recent xenophobic attacks have shown, there are also those who seek to utterly destroy the lives of foreigners; and this, largely, it seems, is in accordance with fictions that have emanated from the mouth of a tribal king who should hardly have been given any airtime to begin with.
A recent photograph from the Daily Maverick by Nombulelo Damba of a burning bus — set alight by angry taxi drivers — is a fitting symbol for all that’s been happening: any hope of genuine progress or of us getting anywhere seems to have gone up in flames. What is the result of all of this? Simply put, the result is persistent immobility. The wisdom of the Bhagavad Gita tells us that real action may look like inactivity, and that inactivity may be disguised as action. I think that many of the troubles in South Africa recently are examples of the latter. There is a lot of “sound and fury,” as Shakespeare has put it, but it “[signifies] nothing.”
Before I get into a brief analysis of the ideological impetus behind all of this negativity (and a brief reflection on what would make a positive difference), I want to point out something that should be pretty obvious but which is often overlooked: the media, by its very nature, centres on exceptions rather than rules. In fact, one should be very careful to universalise what is so obviously particular. The media will tell us that the statue of Cecil John Rhodes has been torn down even before we realised that it was there to begin with. It’ll tell us that Julius Malema is angry (again) without bothering to first confirm that Julius Malema exists. The ordinary everyday stuff of life is not regarded as newsworthy, which is why you don’t get newspaper reports with headlines like Girl goes to school, learns about differential equations or Mother fetches kids from swimming lessons, gets stuck in traffic. Such reports would be much more reflective of the world as it is in all its glorious banality. And yet, such ordinary things are not prized by the media or by the people who pay attention to the media.
Still, with that in mind I think it’s worth dwelling a little on what brings all of this negativity about. What is the explanation for this persistent violence, the striking, the general disgruntlement? I obviously cannot pretend to be able to supply a complete explanation in a small space or even in any space at all, but I think that something of an explanation may be found in that little word freedom that seems to underlie so much of the discourse that comes out of the mouths of so many South Africans. Freedom was always a part of the rhetoric of South African struggle figures before the fall of apartheid, and yet even after the fall of apartheid, freedom is still the number one ideal. This is fair enough, because it is clear that a lot of people in South Africa live in conditions that are far from humanising. A lot of South Africans feel like victims a lot of the time, so the language of freedom is understandable. Arguably, it is the ideal known as freedom from the tyranny of minimum wage that fuels the strikes of the unskilled and undereducated, and the ideal of freedom from the tyranny of ideological structures that has fuelled aggression against colonial and other symbols. Xenophobic violence seems to enact a supposed freedom from the untameable, supposedly threatening other. Such violence also seems to make concrete, in a rather sick and distorted way, the ideal known as freedom from unemployment. The ideal of freedom, while generating fight also generates a great deal of flight, as many South Africans choose to leave this troubled country (there are other reasons for leaving, of course, but that’s not my concern here).
However, freedom is, as the philosopher William Desmond notes, a “god” that has “[retained] something of an unknown character. It seems the more striven for the more it can become a deus abscondis [a god that hides].” Most of all, South Africans seem to prize autonomy. No one wants to feel so utterly dependent. No one wants to feel like their lives are in the hands of others. But this is where the problems begin: This freedom fetishism a lurch towards autonomy is just that; a lurch towards a self that has its own laws and rules (autonomia). And the consequences hardly ever recognised include pride, loneliness, disconnection, miscommunication, and, consequently, a lot of “othering” (creating others even where there are none). Freedom as freedom from envisions a world of alienation and rejection; where the only thing that can be known about the journey is what we are leaving behind. And this just turns us, like Lot’s wife, into pillars of salt. We become something non-human in the process.
There is a bit of dramatic irony here: The more the world is conceived of or perceived as alien and untamable (as equivocal, to use William Demond’s term), the more we will “set out to mitigate this equivocal face .. [b]y subjecting its uncertainty and ambiguity to clear and distinct cognition. By increasing the range of our power over its otherness through mechanical means.” What this means is that the very human desire to find a space of belonging in the world (a place to work or simply a place to feel accepted), when arising only out of a sense of alienation, becomes a kind of brute belonging: a fundamentalist rejection of the distance that is necessary for any kind of love to be present; a kind of clinging to the simplistically ‘knowable’ (the stereotyping of the self and the other) and an acting out in violence (which, as much as it is a violence agains the other, is also violence against the self).
Why this is ironic is that what is enacted is, at best, a refusal to properly understand what is going on (it is a communication that miscommunicates). It is wild and hasty and angry, but the name of the real enemy is deliberately obscured by all of this hasty unreason. And while this will genuinely be rejected, the name of the enemy is really obvious: it’s us. The enemy, in the end, is not out there but within.
As an aside, Malema has used the xenophobia attacks to reinforce his own political agenda: “No Zimbabwean has taken your job,” he said, “You want a job, go to Luthuli House. Take every Zimbabwean back to Zimbabwe, and you will still be unemployed. You can kill all the people of Zimbabwe, and you will still die in poverty.” Malema, like every politician in the history of humanity then took his sophistry to the conclusion that we all knew was coming — the inevitable creation of another enemy: “Your problem is the ANC.”
But, actually, that’s just not true. The ANC has problems, for sure, but it is not the problem. No government is the problem, really, even when it has problems or produces problems. The real problem is with the ethos of so many South Africans, which is largely (albeit not entirely) built upon freedom from — freedom from the ANC, freedom from poverty, etc. Of course, it’s much easier to name and blame that which is out there and alien and other (them, not us), but its alien appearance is always rooted in a fundamental misunderstanding. Its appearance as foreign exists only because of a refusal to engage and be present to its very real unity. A constructed otherness is far easier to create. It’s much harder to notice the obvious fact of the sheer humanity of the other, which amounts to the fact that “them” is an awful lot like “us”.
We would do well to remember, of course, that a thing that is judged — a thing that is reduced to a very narrow conception of that thing — simply cannot be understood. The alienation that exists, then, is something that exists in the minds of the people, not in the reality itself. The conflict is invented not real. I know that this may sound like a harsh thing to say — to say that what our violence is based in is illusion rather than reality — but why else would such violence exist? The real problem is internal, in the stupid constructions we have of our supposed enemies.
Part of the reason for the existence of these constructions, I want to claim here, is that our beloved god, freedom, is conceived of only as a departure; as a movement away from. The obvious question of where we are actually going is hardly ever addressed. If, for instance, you reject the ANC as Malema would have you do, is his equally myopic politics really the thing you want? If you, for instance, reject colonial symbols (which, as far as I can tell, are hardly worth their weight in bronze), what, precisely, are you going to replace them with? Another symbol of political incompetence? This failure to think of where we are actually going is why buses get torched, or why the foreigner gets attacked, or why the strikes persist, or why a million other stupid political moves keep on being repeated, and repeated, ad nauseum, to the very point of nausea. Freedom is, whether we acknowledge it or not, the ability to choose constraints. And the constraints we choose, whether willingly or not, include definite consequences, even if they are consequences that we cannot foresee. All we can really control are our actions. Precisely what comes of those actions is something we’ll have to wait for.
And yet, we can look at a number examples from the lives and experiences of others for ways to guess what might happen when we do one thing or another. We can guess pretty accurately that violence won’t work because it has never worked. It has never made anything better. Never. An eye for an eye leaves the whole world blind. Strikes, too, never produce good working conditions, because they are built on a stubborn refusal of employees to actually take responsibility for their actions. Prejudice is diametrically opposed to progress. South Africa doesn’t get better when we defer to the government, or anyone else in parliament, because it fails to address the one thing that is really true and really worth paying attention to: the only way to make this place better is to, individually, do things that will make the place better. Criticising others, blaming others, punishing others, destroying, tearing down, etc. — none of this will ever work. Because it’s all just a negation: it’s all freedom from, but never freedom for. It affirms nothing. It affirms nothing.
I know there is unemployment, but maybe the question shouldn’t be “Who is taking my job” but rather “How can I be employable?” In fact, wherever there is a problem, the question to ask is not “Who is to blame?” or “What is to blame?” but “What can I actually do about my situation?” or “How can I influence things for the better?” Because this is the real point of autonomy — of self-mastery: it is to figure out a way to live in harmony with others for the betterment of the whole. The point of having freedom from anything is taking note of the responsibility (the ability to respond) to those things that we can actually control.
Freedom is not just freedom from constraints, but is, ultimately, the ability to choose constraints; otherwise, it is not freedom at all.

Revisiting the Map-Territory relation

A while back, I wrote a short bit on the map-territory relation with respect to our interactions with (digital) media. Soon after that, in February of 2014, I was invited to speak at Cafe Riche (the ‘Folisofiekafee’) in Church Square in Pretoria on the same subject. That lecture then became part of my second year teaching. To crystalize my thoughts on the subject I’ve written the following.
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For the longest time, many people have thought that by splitting and dividing reality up into words and meanings, into messages and multiple interpretations, we are able to control the degree to which we are influenced by the world. In other words, many assume that by naming reality they have set up the co-ordinates according to which reality must function; by translating the experience of the truth into language, they assume that they have understood the truth itself. By naming things they have assuming that that have some control over the things themselves. But the truth is always stranger than fiction and reality is bigger than our obsession with naming. This must be the case, I suppose, for we have created fiction and various labels to suit ourselves.
I say this not to disregard the importance of fiction. In fact, I think that fiction must have its place, for it can help us to navigate the reality. Human beings have always tended to rely on stories to make sense of the world, to make it discernable, palatable and relatable. In fact, stories may even make life more livable. But in telling our stories, we need to be careful not to fall into the trap known as the narrative fallacy, which is the name given to the tendency we have to automatically read a story into things that are not narratives, as well as the tendency to assume that just because we understand a story aboutsomething we must actually understand the thing itself.
The story is not the reality, even though it is most definitely a part of reality. The fiction is part of the truth, but not the truth itself. The name is not the thing itself.
Nevertheless, fiction may not just be something we find in stories; that is, in myths, movies and tabloid newspapers, among other things. Rather, it seems that fiction is a symbol for anything that we invent and then consequently interact with. Fiction as a construction is just one medium amongst many others; it is something made, which then shapes the way that we interact with the world that we encounter.
That, of course, would be one definition of a medium. Another one would be, as Marshall McLuhan suggests, that a medium is any extension of ourselves or anything that introduces a new scale or pattern into our associations. For instance, clothing extends the skin and, as fashion has shown us, changes the way that we see and understand people, as well as (more functionally) what sort of weather we are willing to put up with. It is often said that the clothes make the man; and while this is literally false, it is metaphorically true. As another example, a bicycle extends our feet, and so changes the pace at which we live, as do motorbikes and cars and trains. The telephone extends our ears and mouths, and a cellphone builds on this by extending our eyes as well via a screen. And anything connected to the internet — to that massive neural network called the world wide web — extends our minds and our central nervous systems out into the world.
But, of course, while media are extensions of self, they are amputations too. Extend one thing and you’re likely to lose another. Extend your ears and mouth when talking on a cellphone and your ability to drive well is significantly diminished because it renders you somewhat disembodied. These same cellphones will connect us to almost anyone across the world while simultaneously preventing us from connecting with the person or people right where we are.
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So, what do media do? The best way to see this is to try and see media without any content. That way we will see that media force us to rethink our world, not just in terms of encoding and decoding; that is, in terms of content and meaning (or language about the world we live in). Media primarily cause us to rethink our world in terms of context and environment. By rethink, I do not simply meanconceptualise. Media affect us beyond the level of concepts, at the very level of our interactions with the world. For example, the simple invention of an axe causes us to interact with trees differently. Thus we could say that media trump their messages; they bring about changes in the ways that we relate to the world and to each other by operating at a pre-conceptual level that often escapes our conscious awareness and our various ways of articulating our awareness through language (although, to be clear, language is also a medium that shapes our interactions with the world).
Since media intervene in the world as it appears to us, it is obvious that they are anything but inconsequential. This is something we find reflected upon even in a very well known story from Plato’sPhaedrus, which tells us about a conversation between the Egyptian god Thamus and an inventor named Theuth. When a very pleased Theuth shows a skeptical Thamus his brand-new invention of writing, he reports that this invention will make the Egyptians wiser than ever before, and will also give them better memories. Thamus is not convinced. He tells Theuth that this invention of writing will not improve memory at all; writing, to him, is merely a receipt for memory; it is, by analogy, a map to the territory of memory. And with regard to wisdom, Thamus continues, the inventor Theuth is even more mistaken, for writing will produce only a shallow semblance of wisdom — a virtual pseudo-wisdom of a kind that will only manage to mimic the real thing.
Before we side with either Thamus or Theuth, however, we need to recognize, as Neil Postman notes in his book Technopoly (1992), that they are both really one-eyed prophets, incapable of the kind of stereoscopic vision that we need to properly understand how best to interact with media. Theuth sees only the good of the medium, whereas Thamus sees only the bad. Media give and they take away. They are, to use mythological imagery, Trojan horses: gifts that steal. Of course, the gift is a gift (it is something added), but there is certainly some thievery here too (something is taken away). Mediaextend, but they also amputate.
Nevertheless, since most people tend to focus on the more illuminating and giving aspects of media, my aim here is to dwell awhile on the darker effects — the implicit and often unnoticed thievery of media. In particular, I want to look at the various consequences that arise when the map (the mediated construction as we consciously conceive of it) supplants the authority of the territory (the primary and holistic experience of things in reality). I want to look at what happens when the fiction (the content) intrudes a little too much into the reality (the context). How does this affect our debates, our psychologies, and our relationships with life and belief? What do we need to restore the broken relationship between mediation and holistic personal experience? While I won’t be able to solve every aspect of these riddles, I can at lest begin to suggest an outline for navigating the tension between the medium and the message.
A story about this issue can be particularly instructive. Once upon a time, an explorer left the safety of his homeland and went off to the Amazon jungle. For him the experience of this wild, untamed territory was quite beyond anything he had ever imaged and was certainly also beyond anything he could properly describe. So, on returning home, he decided to draw a map to show his kinsfolk how they too could experience something of the wonder that he had experienced.
As it turns out, the people loved the map. They made copies, put the original into a museum, and set up entire schools of thought to interpret the map and argue its significance. Debates were held to consider the different interpretive approaches — there were feminist interpretations and postcolonial interpretations, religious interpretations and irreligious contestations. But no one bothered to go out experience the Amazon jungle for himself, and the explorer was left wondering why he had drawn the map in the first place.
This story is echoed quite beautifully in Lana and Andy Wakowski’s movie The Matrix (1999), in which Neo, the primary protagonist, is confronted with the ways in which the map — the mediated world known as the Matrix (“the world that has been pulled over [his] eyes”) — may in fact be “blinding [him] from the truth” that he actually has no direct access to the real world at all. The truth is that he lives in a dreamscape created by a massive computer simulation. Everything he tastes, touches and smells is brought about by neurological stimulations that he is completely unaware of.
His mentor and guide Morpheus, named after the god of dreams in Greek mythology, speaks to him about this alarming fact as follows: “What you know you can’t explain, but you feel it. You’ve felt it your entire life — that there’s something wrong with the world. You don’t know what it is, but it’s there, like a splinter in your mind, driving you mad.” What Neo feels is that his world has been thrown out of whack. His sense of wholeness and connectedness has been utterly disrupted by this simple fact: a map has replaced the actual territory. Morpheus has a good point: What is madness, after all, but the disconnection between the mind and reality? What is insanity but the firm and unshakeable belief that the fiction is the reality?
This same idea is toyed with in Christopher Nolan’s movie Inception (2010), in which the dream world (another map) has become so indistinguishable from the real world (the territory) that the audience is never quite sure whether the line that separates the two is even there at all. This is precisely what happens when the map replaces the territory: fiction is assumed to be truth.
Another example of this map-territory confusion, with a twist, is found in the fourth season of the old television series Blackadder IV. In one scene, General Melchett, accompanied by the awkward Captain Darling, wants to show off the progress of the British in World War 1 to a young officer named George. What follows is a brief snippet from the screenplay:
Melchett:         … Now let’s talk about something more jolly, shall we? Look, this is the amount of land we’ve recaptured since yesterday.
[Melchett and George move over to the map table.]
George:           Oh, excellent.
Melchett:       Erm, what is the actual scale of this map, Darling?
Darling:         Erm, one-to-one, Sir.
Melchett:       Come again?
Darling:       Er, the map is actually life-size, Sir. It’s superbly detailed. Look, look, there’s a little worm.
Melchett:     Oh, yes. So the actual amount of land retaken is?
[Darling whips out a tape measure and measures the table.]
Darling:       Excuse me, Sir. Seventeen square feet, Sir.
In this scene, Captain Darling points out that the map and the territory can, in fact, be the same thing. Indeed, in a hypermediated world like ours, it is very likely that the mediations and the reality can be taken to be very same thing. This is worth bearing in mind as we move forward. We’re not dealing with a clear split between media and reality, because any artificial split between mediations and reality would be just another construct (i.e. something further mediated). Rather, we’re dealing with therelationship between media and reality while bearing in mind that media are part of reality. Again, by analogy, the Matrix is part of the reality in The Matrix, and the dream is part of the reality in Inception.
Of course, having read a story about an Amazonian explorer or watched either or both of the above movies, or this the scene from Blackadder, we could justifiably proclaim that these stories are just silly. We would like to think that we are enlightened, after all; we empirical existentialists trust our senses and our sensibilities, and movies like The Matrix and Inception are just what they seem to be — clever fictions for an age of doubting Thomases. Choosing to be totally agnostic about the truth of world we live in is like choosing immobility as a means for transportation: it may be interesting for a little while, but it isn’t ultimately very practical or sustainable; it’s not really going to get us anywhere, right? However, keeping in mind that the dichotomy between mediation and reality is a constructed one, perhaps we need to think for a moment of some very obvious ways that the map can replace the territory in the very world that we live in. We need to consider how actual media obscure themselves as well as the rest of the territory that they are mediating.
One example of how a map can replace reality is found in parking pay stations. I can’t speak of the phenomenon with regard to the international stage, but you get these in every shopping mall in South Africa these days. Having spent your money and precious time in your very own consumerist paradise, you will walk to the exit to pay for the parking space that your car has taken up while you were off gallivanting. This is what parking pay stations are for: they mediate between you and the world outside the mall. You have to pay to be able to gain entrance into the non-consumerist landscape. How ironic. So you insert the parking ticket, you discover what you owe, and you pay. Simple enough.
Often, though, and rather annoyingly, the coin that you’re trying to give to the pay station doesn’t get taken up. Instead, it just falls through the machine into the change slot. You try again. The coin falls through again. So, because everyone else does it and because that just happens to be your last usable coin, you take it and rub it against the side of the machine. The idea, you guess, is that the friction will heat the coin up so that it will expand, making it ‘sticky’ enough to be grabbed by the machine. The only trouble is this: It doesn’t really work. There is, in a reality not mediated by the actions of imbeciles, absolutely no reasonable way that anyone can argue that rubbing a coin against the side of a parking pay station is helpful. If anything, rubbing a coin against the side of the pay station is just going to make things worse. The coin is actually shrinking as the friction does its work. In all likelihood, then, this action is just preventing the coin from being useful for pay stations in the future.
The gods of the shopping mall, as I like to call them, have had every opportunity to put notices up to explain just how moronic this coin-rubbing exercise is, but they tend to do something else instead. Often you will find so-called ‘scratch plates’ that have been put up onto the pay stations. With these scratch plates in place, the myth has replaced the facts. Now the coin-rubbing is positively welcomed. It doesn’t work at all, of course, but people choose to believe in it anyway. It’s a placebo without the return. It is analogous to slavery, albeit of a mental kind: work without pay, effort without the payoff. The fact that the coin happens to get taken up after you’ve rubbed it is an effect of the machine simply doing its job, not of any kind of coin-rubbing.
Still, scratch plates are a clear example of how the map can replace the territory within reality itself. This is not some weird alternative reality, but a very real example within the world we live in. You don’t need a virtual Matrix or dreamworld like the one in Inception to keep myths alive. The same thing goes for the close-door button in elevators. I’ve tested this out and it seems to me that there are some (although not all) close-door buttons that don’t actually work. They’re there to create the illusion of a causal relationship; the illusion that you have some part to play in the closing of the lift doors. In reality, the doors close in their own time, apart from our intervention. The map (the close-door button) replaces the reality (the lack of genuine influence).
But how does the map come to replace the reality in this way? It seems to me that you need three interrelated things: ignorance, forgetfulness, and habituation. Ignorance has already been illustrated in the above examples: there is a simple lack of knowledge and awareness about the Matrix or the dreamscape or the nature of parking pay stations. Ignorance is a sign of mental fatigue — a general lack of desire in people to properly examine the world that they live in, to see what they are actually looking at. Ignorance isn’t bliss, in my view; ignorance is irritating. Although all of us will always be ignorant ofsomething, it needs to be recognized that a lot of this ignorance is actually willful: it is a choice.
Secondly, there is forgetfulness, which is linked to ignorance in a way. Forgetfulness also leads us into a map-territory relationship dysfunction. Take, for example, the way that idioms are created. Today we know what it means when someone explains that it’s raining cats and dogs or when there isn’t enough room to swing a cat, but we have forgotten where these phrases come from. In these idioms, though, at least we still have a sense of what the meaning is. So the map may have replaced one reality; i.e. actual circumstances out of which the idiom arose, which involved dogs and cats sliding off roofs when heavy rain came or target practice involving cats. But, the map can still be helpful, albeit in a slightly obscure way, for guiding us in our engagements with another reality (the present moment).
Habituation also leads to a warped map-territory relation. In short, we get used to things. Another story is helpful in this regard. There was once an old monk who, whenever he was on the way to his evening prayers in the chapel, was always pestered by a stray cat that had recently adopted the monastery as its new home. So the monk found a way to lure the cat to some food in the monastery courtyard and then tie it (gently, and in keeping with animal welfare codes, of course) to a tree. Before you get too bogged down trying to imagine how he did this, just notice that his method is not the point of this story. Anyway, having tied the cat to the tree, the old monk was then free to pray in peace. When the monk died some years later, his disciples decided to follow his example. So they would, each of them, lure the cat into the monastery courtyard, tie it to a tree and then go off to the chapel to pray. Some time later, when the cat eventually died, the monks (now thinking that the act of feeding and tying up the cat was imbued with some deep liturgical and spiritual significance) then decided to get a new one. And so it carried on. The original act, we would do well to remember, was deeply sensible. What followed is deeply debatable. The process of having the map replace the territory here was a process of changing the meaning of the actions in question.
The same thing is seen in the famous five-monkey’s experiment. I’m not sure if it is true, but it works as an analogy anyway. Some scientists put five monkeys into a large cage. There in the cage was also an appealing-looking bunch of bananas hanging from the top of the cage, and a ladder that would allow the monkeys to get to the bananas. It did not take long before one of the monkeys spotted the bananas, and consequently began to climb the ladder. As he did this, however, the scientists sprayed all of the monkeys with a torrent of ice-cold water, leaving them all drenched and unhappy. Later, another monkey would try to go for the bananas, but the scientists kept on spraying those monkeys with that cold water until they all learned that the consequence to their banana-mongering was always going to be unpleasant.
Then, one of the monkeys would get replaced by a new monkey, who obviously did not know the drill. He would then go for the bananas almost immediately. The other monkeys, in a desperate attempt to prevent the blast of water that they ‘knew’ was coming, immediately grabbed the new guy and beat him up. The spray of water did not follow, so the monkeys must have assumed that their actions worked to stay the hands of the angry hosepipe. Then, another of the original monkeys would be replaced. He too would go for the bananas, only to receive the same treatment as the previous newcomer. What is most disturbing about this, though, is that the previous new guy joins in with the bullying. The same process of replacing one of the original monkeys with a rookie happened until all of the monkeys in the cage had utterly no understanding of what caused the other monkeys to be so terrified of the consequences of reaching for the bananas. They just did what they did because that is what was, it seems, always done.
The same sort of process happens, although arguably less violently, when we learn how to read and write. Initially, it’s really difficult work. The letters are terrifyingly alien and connecting such strange shapes with precise sounds seems, at first, to be a kind of insanity. But eventually the process becomes so easy that we don’t have to think about it at all. Mediations become invisible. And this is true for all media.
I got my first cellphone when I was twenty, and it seemed incredibly strange to have the possibility of sonic intrusions become permanent. Now, cellphones have become normal to me and to you. Those of you who have grown up with a cellphone in one hand and a dummy in the other would think the absence of a cellphone odd, not the presence of one. Not having a cellphone seems far weirder now than having one is. The strange becomes normal, and the normal becomes unfamiliar. The familiar becomes invisible. That is habituation.
Most of the above examples, if we are honest, are somewhat frivolous. Other examples exist that are much more serious. Various forms of bigotry and prejudice, for instance, would reflect how the map replaces the territory. Fundamentalisms of different kinds — religious, irreligious and nonreligious— may also fall into this same trap. Ideologies and hegemonies need to be noticed for what they are: negotiable pattern making systems. But, as far as I can tell, reality itself is a pattern challenging system. It makes itself known as that thing — that splinter in the mind — that tells us that our relationship with the world is imbalanced.
The territory is always calling the map into question.
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What I want to focus on below, to conclude what has mostly been a very detached, ideas-focused reflection, is the way that digital mediations cause problems with the map-territory relation. Before I get there, though, I need to point out that the solution cannot involve any simplistic and misguided attempt to simply destroy the map completely. Even the Matrix trilogy suggests that such an eventuality would be detrimental; thus, the Matrix is not overcome but accommodated. Mediation is inevitable. In any case, destroying one form of mediation (one map) will always involve another form of mediation (another map). And the various maps we use — rhetorical theory, for instance, or hermeneutics, or more rigid methodologies such as scientific empiricism — do not necessarily involve the negation of other maps. If I, for instance, opt to write with a pen, I am not rejecting the possibility of using a computer to jot down my thoughts. Maps overlap and intertwine, because reality is relational.
Nevertheless, properly rethinking the map-territory relation with regard to media must involve properly diagnosing where we are now in this digitally mediated culture. I would suggest three dominant ways in which the map has come to replace the territory, although my diagnostic list is far from exhaustive.
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  1. Interpassivity
The idea of interpassivity is nicely symbolised by America’s greatest contribution to Western Culture: canned laughter. Okay, that previous sentence is meant to be ironic, but let’s look at what canned laughter is. The basic idea is that when you’re watching television at the end of a long day, the inane sitcom in front of you may not be genuinely funny enough to make you laugh. So the producers of those shows include a “live studio audience” — how alive they are is, of course, debateable. The result is that you hear them laughing at the show you’re watching so that you don’t have to. They’re enjoying themselves so that you’re excused from participating.
Interpassivity is the corollary of interactivity. Media that involve our interactions automatically become interactive, thus increasing the way that two separate things — say, you and the computer — affect and influence each other. But the degree to which interaction is allowed may differ from medium to medium. When everything becomes instant (coffee, email, fast food, etc), the amount of action required from the participating subject is decreased. The subject becomes, in effect, inactive and thus passive.
Interpassivity is experienced through a number of media, of course, and not only through digital media. In universities, professors get to be intellectuals so that students don’t have to be; in electoral booths, people get to vote so that other people can make decisions for them on their behalf; and when you go for a job interview, your university certificate will represent your entire educational experience so that you don’t have to go through another three or four or five years to prove that you’re capable of doing the job that you’re applying for. On other matters, policies are made so that no one actually has to do anything. From these examples, I’m sure you can see that some interpassivity may be a good thing. But making interpassivity the norm is obviously hugely problematic.
Where interpassivity becomes most problematic, in my view, is in the relationship of belief and action. When action is divorced from belief, belief itself has been outsourced. If you say, for instance, that you do not believe in consumerism while you are drinking a McDonald’s milkshake, your belief has been outsourced to those who actually live as if they don’t believe in consumerism. If you say you believe in God, but act as if he does not exist, the same thing happens. Or if you do not believe in God, but act as if he does — well, that is a different issue, but it plays into the same territory: the ironic gesture separates action from belief.
In the world of Facebook, this consequence of interpassivity is found everywhere: you don’t, for instance, need to be an activist who actually changes things; now you can just ‘Like’ a Facebook status that is for/against an important issue and your ethical duty to the world is (so you think) done. This is called clicktivism or liketivism by some people. In fact, in the world of Facebook you don’t seem even need to be a real friend to anyone, because it ‘friends’ people on your behalf.
Then, think about the entire experience of globetrotting that you get through the internet. You also don’t have to go to Paris yourself, really, because you can use the internet to bring Paris to you, through images and videos and #jesuisCharlie hashtags. The whole rigmarole of organising the trip and stepping onto a plane, and so on, is easily done away with.
Interpassivity, as one of digital culture’s trends, suggests that convenience has become a dominant cultural value. Reading a book is so tedious and tiresome, for example, that summaries become essential for school kids and university students. Learning how to spell is so difficult that spell-checkers are relied upon a little too heavily. The examples are almost endless, but the point remains that the map (of media) has replaced the territory (of our own involvement in the world) by making it easy for us to just not get involved.
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  1. Digiphrenia
                  The notion of digiphrenia comes from Duglas Rushkoff’s brilliant book Present shock, as do quite a few of the ideas below. Obviously it references schizophrenia, which suggests a kind of mental illness where fantasies intrude into one’s interactions with reality, sometimes in the form of voices or other delusions. Schizophrenia tends to involve a lot of contradictory elements because the fantasy and the reality are always vying for attention, without always allowing for the possibility that reality should take priority.
Anyway, digiphrenia suggests a kind of ‘mental illness’ where a false sense of time intrudes into the natural rhythms of time as we experience it. Take our bodies, for instance. They have a kind of flow during the day, which involves moments of high alertness and moments of lethargy or sleep. I have heard it said that there are two kinds of people: those who love getting up in the morning and those who hate people who love getting up in the morning. The point is, everyone has a different relationship with time, which is in keeping with our material experience of reality.
So there is this natural biological time that we have embedded into our skin and bones, and then there is virtual time, which is what the digital world runs in/on. Virtual time is always on, always connected, always living and working at a pace that is literally unreal: The map (virtual time) has replaced the territory (real time). The digital clock blinks time to forces us into a kind of perpetual present-tense. Every time you get a notification — a Tweet, a beep, a text, an email, a phone call, etc. — the general expectation of virtual time is that you are or should be available. No matter if you want to sleep, or just take a break, or just put your cellphone away; digital time keeps demanding that you stay here now, now, now, now, and so on.
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  1. Roboticisation and depresencing
Linked to this digiphrenia and its unfair demands on our time, is something we could call roboticisation, which demands that we dehumanise ourselves. This roboticism is linked to the fact that we are “always on”: a beep or a ring from our phone causes us to respond in a kind of automatic and unthinking mode. We start to live more reactively than actively (as in the problem noted above of interpassivity).
Moreover, I’ve already hinted at this above, but it’s worth highlighting: electronic media, from cellphones to the internet, create a kind of distance between us and our immediate world, and that includes our friends and family. We become depresenced: removed from our presence in our own world. Try spend time in blissful silence like you do in real life with someone over Skype. It can’t happen, because you’re not really there, are you? You’re somewhere else. Electronic media connect you to everywhere but where you are.
Just think of how relationships are treated in social media. On Facebook, you get ‘friended’ or you ‘unfriend’ with the click of a button. On Twitter, people get ‘followed’ and if that doesn’t remind you of stalking, then I’m not sure you’re paying attention. On LinkedIn, you can get connected to anyone, even those that you don’t know, because the assumption is that it is a ‘professional’ relationship, i.e. an impersonal relationship.
The world becomes a very abstract thing, and electronic media normalise this sense of removal and distance. We are left, as Sherry Turkle suggests from her research, alone together: there, but really not there at all.
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All of this culminates in a general lack of awareness about what we are doing here. A while back Coca-Cola released an advertisement on the “social media guard” that openly mocked the way that digital technologies create barriers between people. And then, irony of ironies, the advertisement went viral. Of course, part of this irony is embedded in Coca-Cola’s legacy as the so-called “Real thing.” It is a drink that pretends to quench your thirst, but which just makes you thirstier. We are living, symbolically speaking, in the economy or ecology of the sugar rush; we have replaced genuine nutrition with sweets and genuine relationship with superficial interactions. The tragedy of this is that we are left, largely, thirstier, more detached from reality than ever, and even more desirous than ever.
What we need is what I am going to call an “evental reconfiguration of the map-territory relation.” Note that the word is evental (as in event), not eventual. We need an event or more than one event: something that happens to completely reconfigure our perceptions of everything and change our hegemonic vantage points. In other words, we need some kind of intervention that can bring about a sense of humility about the reach of media and a clearer perception of the ways that media act both additively and subtractively as extensions and amputation.
An event is that which calls into question the map, without calling for the need to discard it. To discard it is simply to replace it with another map. Remember that mediation is unavoidable. To understand what an event is, it helps to reference one of the Ancient Greek words for time that we do not really have an English equivalent for. That word is kairos, which roughly means the impact of a moment of time. We usually understand time in terms of chromos or chronology, but kairological time suggests that some moments are more powerful and more memorable. And this basic idea is what we need to be aiming for. When digital technologies, for instance, force us into the perpetual present, it helps to be reminded of the natural rhythms of life that happen outside of that construction.
In my view, two events (kairological moments) are particularly sorely needed. The one is silence, which has almost certainly become the rarest and most valuable commodity in a world of frantic rushing around. We need to learn to be alone without being lonely, and we need to learn to enjoy things without always wanting more. In fact, our always-wanting-more is the clear result of the fact that we have, to such a huge extent, lost the ability to enjoy things (Coke’s other slogan “Enjoy Coca-Cola” is, of course, an ironic plea for us to not enjoy anything: because desire is never really satisfied). If we do not learn to embrace silence, presence will be irrecoverable to us.
The second event is the event of the face of the other. The philosopher Emmanuel Levinas said that this was the starting point of all ethics: the direct encounter with the other as a unique and valuable human being. Recognition is the beginning of wisdom. The face of the other removes our desire to live at the level of the ideas and forces us back into concrete reality.
Does this mean we need to get rid of the digital or the electronic? Well, no. It means, quite simply, putting it back in its place: recovering a clear sense that it is really just a map, and the map is not the territory.

God is unconscious

Recently, I read an article by Sean Illing that talks about the failure of the so called new atheists to properly grapple with the “religious compulsion.” This basically means that they have a tendency to “think of God only in epistemological terms.”  What’s interesting to me is that I happen to know a number of religious folks who do the same thing: belief, for them, is primarily an issue of being right; it is an epistemic concern, rather than a concern of faith or faithfulness, or any search for transcendence. It’s hardly ever got anything to do with the desire for inner transformation that Illing suggests is at the core of the religious impulse. This tendency to argue belief or unbelief in terms of a kind of rigid dogmatism is a really fascinating thing to examine through the lens of psychoanalysis.
In his book Why do I do that?, Joseph Burgo argues, quite reasonably I think, that all of us to varying degrees respond to the world through defence mechanisms of various kinds, which amount to lies we tell ourselves in order to prevent us from confronting that which would cause us pain. Such lies are especially obvious in those who, as Shakespeare would put it, “protest too much.” When someone, for instance, keeps on telling you that they’re not an addict even when you haven’t insinuated anything of the kind you can be almost certain there’s a problem. Why bring it up if it’s not an issue? As another example, there are those studies that demonstrate that it’s very likely that homophobic men are in fact closeted homosexuals. Their hatred is merely an expression of their unconscious desires. Generally speaking, it turns out, those who are most hateful towards the so-called other are often simply reacting to something that they find repulsive in themselves but do not want to acknowledge. They know something, but they do not want to know that they know it.
The first wave of feminism showed their hatred for the patriarchy, for instance, by imitating it without even once realising that that is what they were doing. Even the recent horrors of the xenophobic attacks in South Africa reflect this: foreigners are attacked because they are apparently taking the jobs of locals; they represent the immorality in those people who are unconscious of their own unemployability; violence is done to the other only because the subject is vile.  The list of examples is endless because defence mechanisms are an alarmingly fundamental component of the human experience. For now, though, I want to simply and very briefly look at the issue of belief with the notion of defence mechanisms in mind.
The context I want to use is precisely that of the often wrong-headed debates between theists and atheists. I have a few friends who are rather fond of what is known as “Christian apologetics” — it is not about going around apologising for being Christian, although some of them should try doing this, but is rather about the defence of Christianity  in rational and often rationalist terms. While most of these friends of mine are quite reasonable about their appreciation for apologetics, because they honestly and earnestly see Christianity as a kind of elegant puzzle that is worth figuring out in more clinical or philosophical terms, there’s one friend in particular that I can think of who is so very adamant about his desire to prove the truth of Christianity that something has become extraordinarily clear to me: he doesn’t believe any of it. Consciously, he is a Christian; unconsciously, he is an atheist.
Christianity, in other words, fits intellectually for him but the soul of faith and its goal of inner transformation is utterly gone. For him, to quote Nietzsche, God is dead: a mere dead concept in a system of concepts rather than a living consciousness that grounds our own awakeness. This friend of mine, who when he reads this will probably think I’m talking about someone else, gets very emotional when people tell him that Christianity is bogus or that it includes somewhat irrational or nonrational or perhaps transrational elements. This emotionality, however, is not because he believes they’re wrong but rather seems to be because he actually believes they’re right. Apologetics, for him at least, is the edifice that hides the painful truth: for him, there is no ultimate ground to meaning. He knows about Christianity, but does not feel it. His desperate desire to cling to a particular tradition is really a refusal to acknowledge that the rug has already been pulled out from under him. Keeping in mind that self-deception of any kind is owed largely to pressure — in this case, the social pressure to conform — it is simply much more convenient to hold onto the elegant lies that he has told himself. If he owns up to the lie, he may lose friends, damage his marriage, or change his style of parenting, among a number of other things. Change of any kind is difficult but changing your worldview has massive repercussions. The pain that is being avoided is precisely this need for change.
The same sort of irrational insistence, though, is equally evident in the the rhetoric of the new atheists. Why do they invest so much time and energy disproving what they don’t think is real unless it presents a genuine problem for them? For the usual atheist, God is an indifferent concern. But for the new atheist, God is the biggest issue. Of course, as in the case of my apologist friend, I cannot be absolutely sure that this is what’s going on but the signs are there: something is being repressed, pushed down into the unconscious. In fact, this is why Lacan’s formulation for atheism was not the Nietzschean one —”God is dead” — but rather “God is unconscious.” (The Nietzschean formulation, as intimated above, works better for the fundamentalist theist). That is, for the new atheist, God still functions as if he existed. God is still there, relegated to the unsconscious as the Real that is too traumatic to face up to.
So it is, rather ironically, that in the opposition between new atheists and dogmatic theists (fundamentalists), it is the theists who symbolise atheism and the atheists who symbolise theism. I’m particularly fond of this irony, because it so nicely exposes one of the dominant defence mechanisms highlighted by Burgo, namely splitting. 
Human beings have a tendency to resist ambiguity even though it is so obviously woven into the fabric of our human experience. When faced with complexity, we prefer to opt for either/or distinctions. We tend to ‘resolve’ the complexity, even when it is actually irresolvable. Obviously, splitting the world up in this way has its uses but when it is excessive, as it is in the split between theists and atheists, we run into a whole lot of trouble. The facade (the split) easily replaces the truth (complexity and ambiguity). There’s more to splitting than this, obviously, but for me it’s particularly interesting because this splitting is an attempt, not to make the world more ordered (because reality is what it is, no matter what we say about it), but to defend ourselves against the complexities and traumas that are actually there within ourselves. When people who supposedly believe opposite things clash, the conflict is not the result of a disagreement at all but is the result of a fundamental agreement: both parties don’t believe what they claim to believe, and they also both don’t want to admit it; the other party is an irritation only because they confront the other with this frightening truth: the lie at the centre of their believing.
However, I’m not, in all of this, saying that there is ultimately no value to philosophically investigating belief and unbelief. It is a tremendously valuable thing. God remains, for both atheists and theists, a vital and beautiful question, albeit one that is not revolvable in purely epistemic terms. I’m also not saying that we should all be agnostics: agnostic is just the Greek word for the Latin ignoramus, and I can’t see how this is something worth promoting at all. What I am saying is this: that however we navigate what we believe about what is transcendent or ultimate, we need to begin within the complexities of the human experience, and with a kind of radical honesty about our own darkness, doubts and self-deceptions. We need, in other words, to aim for earth before we aim for heaven (somewhat contra CS Lewis); we need, in a sense, the face of the other before we arrive at the ought (as in the work of Levinas); we need grace before law (to follow St. Paul); and we need to grapple with what it means to live with each other before we throw around theories about how Evolution dispenses with the need for God. If a theory is any good, it will point us back to our own enfleshment, not take us out of it (The word must take on flesh, as the Gospel according to St. John suggests). If we don’t do this, it would probably just mean that we are claiming that right belief is more important than earnest belief.
(Originally published on May 13, 2015)

The problem is not the problem

In Tremendous Trifles, GK Chesterton takes the metaphor of “tumbling trees and the secret energy of the wind” as being “typical of the visible world moving under the violence of the invisible.” He then goes on to suggest that people are a “forest” and that their souls are the “wind” that moves them: everything visible is moved by what is not immediately perceptible. Even an utterly rigid materialism that advocates a wysiwyg ideology is moved about by things that that far from immaterial. Yes, even materialism is rooted in the immaterial.
And it’s actually sad that these days the immaterial is so often regarded as immaterial in the sense of being unimportant, because it is in this that people are most likely to forget that what they see really isn’t what they’re getting. It would be safe to say that when the immaterial is neglected, what we’re seeing is really what we’re forgetting.
A few examples can help to get to what I mean. For instance, we see people at war and then assume that what we’re seeing is conflict. But war is not conflict. It is the inability to deal with conflict. People end up killing each other only because they do not know how to fight with each other. Bloodbaths result from forgetting the immaterial: the real violence, in this case, is actually what precedes the bloodshed. The same goes for relationships that fall apart: the problem (the breakup) is not the problem (bad communication, selfishness, etc.). And the same goes for various addictions (to drugs, bad relationships, work, unhealthy behavioural patterns, etc.): they are definitely not the problem, but very inadequate ways of addressing the problem.
Another example may help to capture the idea in slightly different territory. The case of religious fundamentalism is what most sane people, for fairly good reasons, perceive to be a problem. But fundamentalism is not the problem. It is a solution to a problem; or, to put it better, it is an attempt at a solution to a problem. Like war, it is often the inability to really deal with the problem. The problem here may go by many names, of course: anxiety, fear, doubt, mystery, etc. And fundamentalism—which generally amounts to biting down hard on one particular set of dogmas — is an attempt to deal with the ungraspable and the imperceptible. It resorts to calcified formulas and rigid dogmas taken up for the purpose of controlling the unacknowledged “violence of the invisible.”
Belief, it turns out, can operate less like a way of accepting and engaging with reality than like a defence mechanism: it can very well be a way to protect the believer from reality. Atheists are likely to use this as a way to say that this is why people of faith are such an issue: they naively, it seems, are trying to defend themselves against reality by evoking God and fairies and other imaginary beings. But of course, as usual, I’m applying this to all people everywhere. Atheists are not exempt from their own ideological gods. A million or a billion or more factors all contribute to the adoption of any particular “religious” stance, most of which we are probably unaware of. Because, truly, everyone believes something, even if it is nothing.
In the end, even though what I’m evoking here is probably a bit of a psychological minefield, what I want to get at is actually very simple: If we want to live happily in and harmoniously with the world, my guess is that we need to get behind the obvious. We need to, again, accept the primacy of the invisible. We need to recognise that our metaphysics is always a politics: our assumptions about reality — about what is perceptible and what is not, what is valuable and what is not — will always drive our actions in the world. When we deny the invisible as the ground, all we will end up with is sky and more sky. And it is then that we know what it means to be forever falling.
(Originally published on June 1, 2015)

Morality and Christian identity

It’s probably no surprise that the recent SCOTUS ruling on same sex marriage seems to have upset a few Christians. Of course, many Christians have seen no problem with the new law and have wholeheartedly supported it, but they remain in the minority. But a vast number of others—some of whom are my friends—are less than impressed. As far as I can tell, the big upset has something to do with a what some perceive to be a contradiction of their so-called Christian moral values. If the media is to be trusted, which it shouldn’t be, what many Christians seem to be perceiving is a secular order that is increasingly becoming a greater and greater threat to Christian morality.
Before I get to my reasons for thinking that this is not the main issue here, it is worth noting that the greatest threat to Christianity has never been the secular order. The greatest threat to Christianity has always been Christians themselves. This fact was humorously reflected by Pope Pius VII’s Secretary of State, Ercole Cardinal Consalvi, back when Napoleon threatened to “crush” the Roman Catholic Church using his very small French fist. The cardinal shook his head at the emperor’s naïveté and simply said this: “If in 1800 years we clergy have failed to destroy the Church, do you really think that you’ll be able to do it?”
Christians have been trying to destroy Christianity for two millennia, although usually not on purpose, and yet it’s still here. One of the prime ways that Christians have gone about trying to destroy their Christianity is by insisting on coupling a particular kind of morality with their very sense of identity. This may seem like a fairly innocent thing to do, but it is nothing less than the number one crime of religious orthodoxy. In fact, a few of Jesus’ more radical pronouncements had to do with the importance of always questioning one’s identity (“deny your self,” “hate your family,” “love your enemy,” etc.)
Religion (as Law) has always been the enemy of authentic Christian faith. So, in case you missed it, the major irony here is that the destruction of Christianity, or just a part of its destruction, is most evidenced by those Christians who are moralising about same sex marriage, as if it has anything to do with them as my friend Jonty Langley has helpful suggested here. Just to be provocative, allow me to say this: if you want to know who the Christians aren’t, just look for the moralisers.
Of course, it’s also not news that Christians are accustomed to thinking of their ‘Christian identity’ (which is an oxymoron, by the way) primarily in terms of their moral values. This, from the perspective of the popular media, seems to be Christianity’s only contribution to society, apart from their horrifyingly bad pop music and irritating rhetoric. But, really, this is precisely where Christians in particular go wrong: they insist that morality is married to their identity rather than being just a symptom of their faith in the Transcendent Other who also, in orthodoxy, is the Other who took on flesh and moved into a very human neighbourhood not only disguised as a man but as a man.
By marrying morality and identity, true transcendence actually becomes irrelevant; what matters most is not the Good or the Just, but the Tribe (What Lacan calls ‘big Other’ and what Heidegger calls ‘The They’ are fairly decent approximations of this tribe because they reflect not God but an externalised idea of the collective spirit/Spirit of the group) . And when the tribe has spoken, as Simone Weil points out well in advance of years of torture-by-Reality-Television, both conscience and intelligence are defeated. When the tribe makes the rules, in other words, morality itself becomes immoral, and the members of the tribe become morons. Say it with me: Moronic immoral morality. We could even say that if you were to turn empathy into a law, you would have tyranny.
To better understand this moralistic loss of transcendence, which is what fundamentalists and moralists represent so well, it is helpful to understand that there are, generally speaking, two ways to set up the identity of any community or tribe. There are, in other words, two kinds of culture (religion being one expression of culture). The first is based on violence, which insists on naming an enemy in order to establish its own credibility. The enemy could be anyone, but, following the insights of mimetic theory, it’s easiest to pick an arbitrary but obvious mark of uniqueness. In the time of King James VI of Scotland of the King James Bible fame, any wort would do. This arbitrary mark would be used as a reason to expel the enemy from the midst of the community, or, in very bad cases, would be used as an excuse to legitimate the committing of a murder.
This is also known as scapegoating, and it is used by just about anyone. For example, the New Atheists are fond of scapegoating Christians to establish their own sense of identity, and Christians (especially of the fundamentalist, puritan strain) are fond of scapegoating all kinds of people, depending on the season: New Atheists, Muslims, and (lately) people who fit into the LGBTQ categorisation. Christians will scapegoat other Christians, too, especially when those other Christians are perceived to be heretics—a fact that should be taken as a sign that the main danger to Christianity, especially of the kind that is legitimated by symbolic violence, is not “out there” but part of its very inner structure. As I said, the real threat to Christianity has always been Christians.
This way of establishing identity through scapegoating is the easiest because you never have to spend much energy trying to figure out who you are or even who your enemy truly is (The enemy is you and me, by the way, and your and my selfishness). And you certainly never have to figure out how to love your (other) enemy because you’re too busy naming and shaming them for failing to uphold your own group’s standards.
So, obviously, the fundamental hypocrisy in this way of establishing identity is that the very source of the identity is the one (person, community, people-group, nation, etc.) that has been expelled/rejected. The rejected stone has become the cornerstone. In other words, the very ‘problem’ for the community is in fact the primary reason (or one of the primary reasons) for its existence. Put in more paradoxical terms, for the scapegoaters there is no greater friend than their greatest enemy. Without their enemy, they wouldn’t be who they (think they) are. Without the ‘poison’ they would have no ‘health’ (because the poison is the cure).
The second way of establishing community identity is through solidarity; that is, through a shared connection: something like the feeling of being part of a minority group, or the shared experience of a ritual, an event like a shared loss, or even a shared failing, as in Alcoholics Anonymous. With solidarity, no external enemy is needed. Because the enemy is us. We, solidarity teaches us, are our own worst enemy. And yet solidarity is a form of forgiveness because it is a form of acceptance of individuals as individuals, no matter what their current state of being. “Family,” we learn from Lilo and Stitch, “means nobody gets left behind.”
But, sadly, this second way of establishing community identity—clearly the healthier and less violent of the two—is often usurped by the first. Countless reasons can be offered for this eventuality, but human arrogance is first on my list. Ignorance is probably number two. And arrogance and ignorance form a half rhyme, which is nice. A lack of empathy is by definition part of both arrogance and ignorance.
So, anyway, as I’ve said, for the Christian (fundamentalist, puritan, moralist), the LGBTQ community has tended to be an easy target. And by making same sex marriage legal and widely acceptable, what SCOTUS has done—at least as the average Christian moralist perceives it, albeit sometimes unconsciously—is set up the way forward for Christendom to start slackening its own moral boundaries.
The ‘slippery slope’ argument that has been bandied about by ninth-rate philosophers and first rate trolls is not a really worry about what’s going on in the world for the Christian (the world has always been full of troubling morality for Christians). The ‘slippery slope’ is feared because of what it may do in the fundamentalist’s or moralist’s own sacred territories. The real threat is to tribal identity; the worry is that the morality that has become central to Christian identity will become somehow generic, which is to say that the very centre of (perceived) Christian identity—a particular moral code—will no longer be uniquely Christian.
So, in brief, if morality and identity are coupled (a move I see as a genuine heresy rather than a symbol of orthodoxy), any challenge to that morality is really a challenge to the cohesion of the tribe. If the morality of the tribe is dismantled, and if your identity has been rooted in that morality, the question will become this: What does it mean to be a Christian? i.e. Does it even make a difference to be a Christian at all?
I realise that there is some speculation in what I’ve said so far, but it is not entirely based upon guesswork (I also know that there’s more to it than what I can cover here, so please be generous in allowing for the fact that I’m fully aware of the complexities of the issues I’m discussing). A large number of Christians will couple the legalisation of same sex marriage with what they perceive to be the natural consequence of the law: the idea that pastors or clergy in churches will have to perform marriage ceremonies for gay/lesbian couples, or that bakers will have to cater for them, or that designers will have to make invitations for their weddings, etc. But, again, to restate my central point:this is not an issue of morality but about a perceived morality, which is really about identity.
It turns out that the historic, orthodox Christian faith, especially in its earliest days, did not always insist that morality should be synonymous with identity. This is not to say that all moralities are unimportant, but rather that they are not the main priority.
In fact, the radical thing that an authentic Christocentric Christianity does is separate the issue of identity from morality. Who you are and how you live, it turns out, does not necessarily mean that you are no longer “in Christ”— the phrase used by the early Christians to designate the identity of those in those early Christian communities. Being “in Christ,” it turns out, amounted to a collective rejection of tribal identity; the mark of the Christian, then, was simply a shared identification with the God-man who was crucified, and that is all. (Certain communities did have moral codes, as we find especially in the letters of St. Paul, but none of that had to do with so called Christian identity and everything to do with making community life heaven or hell—I feel like I need to add caveats to everything I’m saying here, but I will let the moralisers and the Council for All Things Orthodox and The Correct Interpretation of Scripture have whatever field day they want with this).
So, again: morality and identity are not inextricably bound in Christianity. St. Paul, for one, identifies himself as “the chief of sinners” (1 Tim 1.15)—in the present tense—and yet does not regard himself as less a part of Christ because of his crimes (scapegoating being the chief one among them, as we learn from the book of Acts). And Jesus, in the first pronouncement of his Sermon on the Mount suggests that the “poor in spirit” (another way of saying “moral reprobates”) are not in any way excluded from the “Kingdom of Heaven” (see Matthew 5). The morally reprehensible are no less able to come into contact with the Transcendent.
In fact, after a rather spicy tirade against a community of Galatians, who had wrongheadedly made their Christianity into a tribal concern (symbolised by their adherence to the law of circumcision), St. Paul angrily tells them that he wishes they would go all the way and just hack off their dicks and balls completely rather than just chopping off a bit of foreskin (Galatians 5.12). It’s a weird passage to be sure—somewhat sanitised by most English translations—but if nothing else this is to say that making some law into the mark of a person’s identity is tantamount to a kind of personal castration.
Here’s the kicker of Paul’s tirade in Galatians: It is not the excluded other that loses out, for Paul, but the newly castrated insider—the holy faithful, clutching at their groins in agony after their little ritual, unable to see that the non-castrated other is right there, being human just like them, and also unable to notice that they have just altered their own sexual identities. (As an aside, isn’t it interesting that sexual identity has become such a massive issue for Christians, when there are really far bigger and more serious problems in the world—poverty, violence, etc.?)
In fact, carrying Paul’s castration metaphor a little further, any violence (real or symbolic) is merely a sign of the puritan’s impotence. The reason that religious people go to such lengths to enforce a moral code or some other concrete way to set up identity is because faith is a terribly uncontrollable, mystical thing. I speak from experience. In fact, faith and certainty are not the same thing. If anything, certainty is almost definitely the opposite of faith. Faith is uncertainty. Faith is doubt.
Faith is a leap into the dark, closely allied to the hope that Someone will be there to catch you. Unfaith, it turns out, is also a leap into the dark (it’s a kind of faith), but it is closely allied to the hope that No One will be there to catch you or anyone else. But, as I’ve said on this blog before, the fundamentalist—and the moral puritan—substitutes knowledge for faith. For him or her, you don’t have to believe because you know. The puritan has their morality sorted. So they don’t have to reach out to the other. The moralist knows the difference between right and wrong as immanent concerns, and so there is no need for God anymore. In short, the moralist is the atheist among the true believers.
I know I’m going on about this a bit long, but what I’m getting at is the so called “Death of God” is not something that happens outside the church, in the secular order, but inside the church, where people have no faith left, no love left; and so they resort to rules, laws, and other assertions of identity. The anchor of identity in the transcendent is replaced by an anchor in the immanent.
St. Paul’s tirade against tribal identity in Galatians is echoed in far more theology than I care to go into right now. In any case, what I do want to point out is that faith is almost certainly a critique of the tribe and its obsession with scapegoating. It is a destabilising kind of certainty that rests itself in the hope of the Transcendent, which manifests itself not just in the love of friends but in the love of those considered enemies. It is faith, which is a particular view of the way we ought to relate to the world, that brings about the truly ethical, not some purity code or moral law.
This idea is somewhat captured by Kierkegaard, who affirms the identity of the Christian in quite a unique way. He talks about three levels of living, each one higher than the previous one—aesthetic, ethical and religious. And the weird thing he does is suggest that the religious (as an affirmation of faith, not law) is so much higher than the ethical that it can, if granted by God, render the ethical mute. This is also referred to as the teleological suspension of the ethical. I know that there are complex aspects to all of this, of course, but this (despite all appearances) is a blog post and not a book.
The gist of what I’m getting at, though, is still simple: the minute the so-called Christian shifts into a way of operating that regards morality as synonymous with identity, he or she has shifted away from the Christ of the Christian scriptures, who cared more for loving people than for judging them, who cared more for company than alienation, and who cared more for forgiving people than for holding their so called sins against them. The sheer and unabashedly radical nature of Christ’s ethics is found in its insistence upon intimacy with the “enemy” other rather than insisting on general laws for setting up judgment against the alien. Even the statement “If your enemy hits you on the one cheek, offer him the other” is about confronting your enemy with your humanity, just as “If your enemy asks you to carry his stuff for one mile, go two” is about allowing time to let your enemy see who you really are.
The people who operate outside of this loving, forgiving spirit of Christ are in fact aligning themselves with the Pharisees—those people so concerned with purity codes that they would exclude those who had violated them. In fact, it’s weird to me that Christians tend to read Jesus’ criticisms of these Pharisees as if they are about someone else (some other Pharisees out their in the world: heretics, in other words). But Jesus, if he is still speaking today as Christians believe he is, is addressing them. They are the new Pharisees for embracing a tribe that casts out the heretics. They are the new “sons of hell” and “bastard children of serpents”—these are phrases Jesus uses, in fact, to point out that the puritans are Satanic, not the so-called sinners. The people most in danger of hell are not the wicked, but the self-righteous. Why? Simply because their entire existence works according to the principle of scapegoating.
As an aside, as John Milbank points out somewhere, morality itself is generally problematic because it assumes a state of disorder and immorality that needs to be brought under control. It assumes, in other words, that the world is inherently evil and that goodness needs to be be brought to it—a Gnostic conception of reality. It begins with Genesis 3 without taking Genesis 1 and 2 into account, and this, it turns out, is a terribly violent thing to do.
It also turns out that a lot of Christians in the political sphere insist upon their laws and their morality in a way that makes it seem like that is the purpose of Christianity. But that’s just not it. In fact, I would say that as soon as Law becomes the main focus of any discussion, what we are dealing with is a failure to love (and a failure of faith). We need laws against murder, because people fail to love, and we need laws against bigotry, because people fail to love. And love, in case you missed it, is the only thing that Christian orthodoxy insists on unequivocally.
So the thing that I really wish for more than anything is that Christians would learn to love first. If they would just see the other as a human being with hopes, dreams, fears and failings just like them, there is actually a chance that people would take their Christianity more seriously. If you look at history, you will see that this is actually why Christianity grew in the first place. (The New Atheists’s account of history are largely bogus, so I would start with David Bentley Hart’s Atheist Delusions or the work of Rodney Stark). The Christians were the ones loving people, serving people, being compassionate. That was why the Roman Empire persecuted them—because their allegiance was not to a Caesar (or some other form of Empire Nostalgia) who advocated scapegoating rituals and violence, but, rather, their allegiance was to a God who they believed, through Jesus, had told them to love without reservations.
What I’m encouraging here is that Christians should re-enact the gigantic humility of the Incarnation rather than the supreme arrogance of raising themselves to the level of God or some other Lawmaker. Because the lesson of the Incarnation, if nothing else, is that God is somehow incomplete—not God—without also being human; and also that when we take on flesh and blood, there’s a pretty good chance that love will actually win. But for love to even stand a chance, love must come first.
(Originally posted at duncanreyburn.com on July 17, 2015)

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