You probably won’t care to know this, Stephen, but your little rant about God didn’t exactly solve the whole God-debate for me (I don’t think that’s what you intended anyway). I actually found it rather funny that a man could summon so much aggression against a character that he regards as fictional. Imagine someone getting really, really angry at Frodo for being short.
Anyway, even if the God you were talking about did exist, your outrage didn’t manage to convince me, once and for all, that atheists of the more dogmatic kind are the most trustworthy source when it comes to assessing the finer points of what is real, true and plausible. I still have too many questions, and I have no doubt that I will have a few more even once/if those questions are answered. And, anyhow, it seems to me that there are few important things that you may have overlooked, like, say, three thousand years of mysticism, philosophy and metaphysical speculation. Still, to give credit where it is due, you’ve raised some very interesting and valuable points while also conjuring up some very serious doubts in my own mind about the validity of your brief argument.
For instance, while I agree absolutely with you that there’s a lot of really awful stuff going on that’s ‘not our fault’ and while there seems to be no shortage of what is ‘utterly, utterly evil’, this isn’t enough to convince me that it would be some God’s fault. Actually, to confuse even a God you don’t believe in with everything else that happens seems to me to be a fairly obvious category error. It’s like confusing a manufacturer of a car with an accident that happened in that car last Tuesday because someone lost concentration while driving. Yes, the car was involved, but it was not the manufacturer’s doing, was it? Even with the limitations of this analogy in mind, I’m not convinced that the alternative — namely that it’s all just blind, indifferent chance — is a much better option, because in that scenario not only does suffering occur, but it, like everything else, also has no grounded meaning despite the fact that we insist on it meaning something.
To make the issue much more confusing, though, there also happens to be a rather ridiculous amount of stuff around here that is quite astonishingly good (which is something you only hint at in your rant). There’s tea, the Medusa Nebula, the books of Douglas Adams, and Mozart’s Clarinet Concerto, for starters, not to mention about a centillion other things. Actually, there is, quite overwhelmingly, more good in the universe than bad, or at least more that is remarkable than merely detestable. But a negativity bias makes this easy to overlook, I guess.
You began your rant about what you’d say to God if you discovered that he or she is really there, with ‘I’d say bone cancer in children? What’s that about? How dare you?’ And I couldn’t help but want to draw your attention to a more fundamental point: ‘Children? What are they about? How dare you?’ I’m being facetious, but the trouble with your outburst was that it put the very small cart of things that go wrong before the very large horse of all the things that actually go right in the world. Like, for example, the fact that any of us can string a sentence together or the fact that most of us have legs and opinions.
I’m not dismissing the horrible stuff in the universe. I agree with you that it’s all a problem of unfathomable proportions. But the good stuff is a problem too, or at least a gigantic question. My point is that I think that levelling complaints even at a God you don’t believe in should include complaints about the fact that there is existence as such. Because without it, there’d be quite literally nothing to worry about.
It seems to me, in my naivety perhaps, that existence itself is in itself rather good even in spite of the misery that we go through. Even after going through some very terrible things myself, I cannot help but marvel at the sheer, bewildering thereness of it all. The universe is, when we really pay attention to it with the eyes of a child rather than the cynicism of an old man, a surplus of astonishment. Even the fact that the central nervous system picks up pain, for example, is itself nothing other than remarkable, and, yes, even good (as researchers studying leprosy, that disease that takes away a person’s ability to feel pain, will tell you). The fact that the nervous system knows that something is wrong is rooted in the reality that something is very, very right. Something is working. That is why we know when things go wrong.
And then there’s our ability to recognize the trauma and tragedy of having a child with bone cancer. The reason it grieves us so is because we are absolutely, unequivocally convinced of the profound value of that child’s life. This value, in case you missed it, is not an evolutionary concept. It’s not something that blind chance accounts for; well, not unless you take evolution in teleological terms, which would be tantamount to accepting that there is a God out there after all. And have you ever noticed just how profound the compassion that we see in the face of suffering is? Ghandi, Mother Theresa, etc. Selflessness of that sort is an absolute violation of evolutionary imperatives, and yet there it is. It doesn’t explain the suffering or explain it away, but it acknowledges that there is still goodness in the world that’s worth paying attention to.
Which brings me to what perplexes me most about your tirade. It was rooted in a very deep sense of what is moral, too. And whether you like it or not, such morality seems to be alarmingly dependent upon a particular understanding of the good that was handed to you, in this case, largely by the Christian tradition that still flows through the veins of Great Britain despite its largely atheistic contemporary culture. In fact, it’s the very morality against which you measure the Greek gods, who at least weren’t pretending to be any good at all. Would you genuinely prefer morally inconsistent gods like those of the Greeks? No problem! Just remember that if your universe were built on such moral inconsistencies, your very own tirade would have been logically impossible. We have to have an idea of what is good before we can go on at length about what isn’t.
And then, there was the bit about calling the God you don’t believe in stupid. Well, actually, that bit makes me laugh. Because there, right there, is another absolute in your rhetorical arsenal called intelligence, as if in this atheistic, indifferent universe it actually matters. I know, however, that you’re probably directing that comment against people who are stupid enough to believe in God. But, well, belief is not about intelligence. God is not something you can know in the same way that you can know what took place on QI or know what the capital of Paraguay is. It’s not a knowable thing, which is precisely why God is the subject of faith and not knowledge. And so you will also find very intelligent people who believe in God and very stupid people who don’t, and vice versa.
So, well, there you have it. You have raised questions about suffering, which is fair because we all have those questions, but you also inadvertently used a predominantly religious grounding on which to raise all those questions. And that’s not playing fair. As Nietzsche said about George Eliot and her ilk: ‘They are rid of the Christian God and now believe all the more firmly that they must cling to Christian morality’. I find Nietzsche’s insane atheism more honest simply because he was consistent in his rejection of God.
But, really, I’m not trying to prove anything here, Stephen. I’m not trying to say, Look, there’s morality so there must be a Moral Law Maker, a.k.a God. I’m not even saying, Look at all that’s good in the world; there must be a Source of all goodness, or Look at how we unavoidably find or make meaning even in the face of the incomprensible so there must be something meant by Someone about all of this. God is not disprovable by what you hate or provable by what I like. What I am saying is that things like morality and goodness and meaning are questions that you cannot simply accept without bothering to notice the degree to which you are still relying on religious language, even in a world of radical contingencies.
But, anyway, I still want to thank you for giving me a few things to think about. I cannot provide any resolution to the matter, though, because I don’t think there is one. People have had questions about God and suffering since time immemorial. And I, for one, would like to use those questions to push me to think a little more. Because the only thought that should be stopped is the thought that stops us thinking. I’m glad this is something you seem to agree with. It’s always good to get the conversation going.
Yours sincerely,
Duncan Reyburn
(Originally published on February 8, 2015)
Any resemblance to actual ideas, living or dead, including events and localities, is entirely hermeneutical
Sunday, January 3, 2016
Love is this
On the surface and from the outside, Valentine’s Day looks like the ultimate symbol of our cultural somnambulism about love, just as Christmas seems to have become a symbol for our unconsciousness about what Christian theology refers to as the Incarnation. Valentine’s Day, with its consumerist sea of plastic reds, whites and pinks, heartshaped everythings, chocolates, flowers and cards, makes love seem like a commodity. Restaurants and hotels are booked ahead of time, condom sales skyrocket, and so, it turns out, does the likelihood of unplanned pregnancies.
But apart from and in spite of all of this commodity fetishism, Valentine’s Day can also be taken to reflect a deep collective trust that, as Virgil reminds us, “amor vincit omnia“; most of us (if such a generalisation can be allowed) really do hope that love wins. Or, to put it differently, we want to believe, as St. Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians intimates, that “love never fails”. The Pidgin’ English bible puts the same idea this way: “Wen you get love an aloha, dat no goin pau eva!” (1 Cor 13.8). If that doesn’t put a smile on your face, I’m not sure if anything can.
But, what does this no-goin-pau-eva even mean? I suppose I could go on for a while about this most sublime of subjects, because it is so very, very crucial to any hope we have of experiencing the best that existence has to offer, but I just want to mention a few ideas that have made me think of love differently, starting with the rather esoteric notion of tzimtzum.
Tzimtzum, from the Kabbalist tradition, is the notion that when God began the process of creating everything that we perceive, he had to contract or constrict his own being. “In order to create,” the mystic philosopher Simone Weil suggests, “God had to hide himself; otherwise, there would be nothing but God.” There is a paradox here if we think about the Johannine expression of God as being love in his very nature (1 John 4.8), because it suggests that God (the All) is precisely the being who recedes in order that other things can live, breathe and have presence (i.e. God becomes, by choice and activity, the Not-All-who-could-be-All-and-therefore-is-All).
Even if you stick with atheism, the idea of tzimtzum is still beautiful: the ultimate No-Thing, as the Hasidic mystics sometimes call God, recedes into almost-absence in order that the existence of things is made possible. In fact, if you like playing with concepts the way that I do, you may even conclude that atheism may be taken as a kind of symbol of this very notion: the atheist believes so strongly in divine contraction that the divine is no longer an overt feature of her horizon of understanding. Although, of course, logically speaking we must acknowledge that hiddenness is not necessarily a sign of nonbeing. I’m aware that there are nonetheless forms of atheism that would be less than amicable towards this idea.
Still, this tzimtzum is the kind of idea that can “break your brain” (to quote my students) if you think about it too long. To me it’s a profound image for what it means to love another human being: to love well, to truly love, we must recede, step back. The ego must contract. We must enter into that hilarious self-forgetfulness — the same kind of self-forgetfulness that allows us to revel in a good joke or marvel at a profound work of art. We must open up a space for the other person to be, to breathe and be recognized for who they are rather than just what they can do for us.
This brings me to the second conception of love: love as agápē (ἀγάπη), which is the word used by St. Paul to describe love in his famous passage from 1 Corinthians 13 mentioned above — arguably the most beautiful passage ever written on love. It means the kind of love that we know best as a pure gift. It is not given on the basis of any kind of obligation or transaction or law; it is never deserved, owed or owned. Rather, it is a kind of exuberant, riotous love that sees a need and fills it, no matter what has happened or what will happen as a consequence. This agapeic love rescues us from that undiluted erotic love that fuels Hollywood’s terrible Romantic comedy/drama narrative engine; that erotic love which on its own and left to itself is not so much concerned with the meeting of the self and the other as it is with the consumption of the other by the self. Eros tends to lurch forward out of a sense of privation or lack; agápē is an overflow.
Which brings me, lastly and most briefly, to the wonderful definition of love offered by Alain Badiou. Love, for him, is co-subjectivity. It is not a mono-subjectivity — a one-perspective thing — but is that which arises out of the dance between selves and others. The idea here is that the kind of love that fails to see the other is not really love at all. Only God can endlessly recede (as in tzimtzum) or endlessly give (as in agápē) — Only God can be both the No-Thing and the All-Thing, but our human experience tells us that we, as incomplete and finite beings, recognise love only in reciprocity: in mutual recognition. This view of love tells us that we are not individuals but interdividuals, born and raised to relate to the world and others in it.
This is not to give any weight to the disastrous and false Hollywood phrase “You complete me.” Love, if anything, is the assumption that the other is there, not to complete the self, but to be celebrated for herself. Love, if anything, reminds us that we are ontologically interdependent. “You incomplete me” would be a more accurate way of describing what love does: it places us always in awe and in debt. And yet, there is another paradox (because there always is another paradox) and it is this: when we contract, and give and recognise our incompleteness, we find ourselves filled; in being confronted with our own diminishing (tzimtzum), we find ourselves given over to and even capable of abundance (agápē). In this genuine love, our entire perception of reality is transformed; even lack becomes bountiful. The great mystic Rumi puts it well, “With thee, my love, hell itself were heaven; With thee a prison would be a rose garden."
(Originally published on 16 February, 2015)
But apart from and in spite of all of this commodity fetishism, Valentine’s Day can also be taken to reflect a deep collective trust that, as Virgil reminds us, “amor vincit omnia“; most of us (if such a generalisation can be allowed) really do hope that love wins. Or, to put it differently, we want to believe, as St. Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians intimates, that “love never fails”. The Pidgin’ English bible puts the same idea this way: “Wen you get love an aloha, dat no goin pau eva!” (1 Cor 13.8). If that doesn’t put a smile on your face, I’m not sure if anything can.
But, what does this no-goin-pau-eva even mean? I suppose I could go on for a while about this most sublime of subjects, because it is so very, very crucial to any hope we have of experiencing the best that existence has to offer, but I just want to mention a few ideas that have made me think of love differently, starting with the rather esoteric notion of tzimtzum.
Tzimtzum, from the Kabbalist tradition, is the notion that when God began the process of creating everything that we perceive, he had to contract or constrict his own being. “In order to create,” the mystic philosopher Simone Weil suggests, “God had to hide himself; otherwise, there would be nothing but God.” There is a paradox here if we think about the Johannine expression of God as being love in his very nature (1 John 4.8), because it suggests that God (the All) is precisely the being who recedes in order that other things can live, breathe and have presence (i.e. God becomes, by choice and activity, the Not-All-who-could-be-All-and-therefore-is-All).
Even if you stick with atheism, the idea of tzimtzum is still beautiful: the ultimate No-Thing, as the Hasidic mystics sometimes call God, recedes into almost-absence in order that the existence of things is made possible. In fact, if you like playing with concepts the way that I do, you may even conclude that atheism may be taken as a kind of symbol of this very notion: the atheist believes so strongly in divine contraction that the divine is no longer an overt feature of her horizon of understanding. Although, of course, logically speaking we must acknowledge that hiddenness is not necessarily a sign of nonbeing. I’m aware that there are nonetheless forms of atheism that would be less than amicable towards this idea.
Still, this tzimtzum is the kind of idea that can “break your brain” (to quote my students) if you think about it too long. To me it’s a profound image for what it means to love another human being: to love well, to truly love, we must recede, step back. The ego must contract. We must enter into that hilarious self-forgetfulness — the same kind of self-forgetfulness that allows us to revel in a good joke or marvel at a profound work of art. We must open up a space for the other person to be, to breathe and be recognized for who they are rather than just what they can do for us.
This brings me to the second conception of love: love as agápē (ἀγάπη), which is the word used by St. Paul to describe love in his famous passage from 1 Corinthians 13 mentioned above — arguably the most beautiful passage ever written on love. It means the kind of love that we know best as a pure gift. It is not given on the basis of any kind of obligation or transaction or law; it is never deserved, owed or owned. Rather, it is a kind of exuberant, riotous love that sees a need and fills it, no matter what has happened or what will happen as a consequence. This agapeic love rescues us from that undiluted erotic love that fuels Hollywood’s terrible Romantic comedy/drama narrative engine; that erotic love which on its own and left to itself is not so much concerned with the meeting of the self and the other as it is with the consumption of the other by the self. Eros tends to lurch forward out of a sense of privation or lack; agápē is an overflow.
Which brings me, lastly and most briefly, to the wonderful definition of love offered by Alain Badiou. Love, for him, is co-subjectivity. It is not a mono-subjectivity — a one-perspective thing — but is that which arises out of the dance between selves and others. The idea here is that the kind of love that fails to see the other is not really love at all. Only God can endlessly recede (as in tzimtzum) or endlessly give (as in agápē) — Only God can be both the No-Thing and the All-Thing, but our human experience tells us that we, as incomplete and finite beings, recognise love only in reciprocity: in mutual recognition. This view of love tells us that we are not individuals but interdividuals, born and raised to relate to the world and others in it.
This is not to give any weight to the disastrous and false Hollywood phrase “You complete me.” Love, if anything, is the assumption that the other is there, not to complete the self, but to be celebrated for herself. Love, if anything, reminds us that we are ontologically interdependent. “You incomplete me” would be a more accurate way of describing what love does: it places us always in awe and in debt. And yet, there is another paradox (because there always is another paradox) and it is this: when we contract, and give and recognise our incompleteness, we find ourselves filled; in being confronted with our own diminishing (tzimtzum), we find ourselves given over to and even capable of abundance (agápē). In this genuine love, our entire perception of reality is transformed; even lack becomes bountiful. The great mystic Rumi puts it well, “With thee, my love, hell itself were heaven; With thee a prison would be a rose garden."
(Originally published on 16 February, 2015)
The hammer and the nail: A lenten reflection
A nail that sticks out will be hammered down. The basic idea of this Japanese proverb is that the person who stands out in any way is going to be pummeled back into place, usually by a crowd who cannot handle any kind of nonconformity. It’s the kind of idea that reinforces Kierkegaard’s contention that the “crowd is the lie” because in the end the central impetus of the hammer is not truth at all, but uniformity and conformity, which apart from truth are ultimately a kind of deformity.
Of course, the proverb can be taken as a complement alongside another Japanese proverb, which says that envy is the companion of honour: if you stand out you’re bound to be met with criticism and resistance; and some of that criticism and resistance may be thoroughly unpleasant, or even violent. But this is ultimately not because you’re simply a loser in the eyes of the critics. Rather, the chances are that you’re on the side of the extraordinary. You’re doing something few others would dare to do. The hammer tries to degrade the nail because it finds the nail threatening.
This is not to say that the hammer that comes down on the nail is always wrong. Criminals who get punished for crimes have been met with the hammer of justice precisely because they have stepped outide of what is legal. The hammer in this instance can be very right, unless the law is wrong that is. And, yes, the law can be wrong. This is why we must call the law into question as often as we can, not to rebel against it but to check that it still serves justice. Nevertheless, it is not this kind of critical, careful legal hammering that I am primarily concerned with here. My concern is with the kind of hammer that comes down unreasonably, hastily, angrily and vindictively. This is the kind of hammering I have a problem with.
And to help to express my problem with this kind of hammering, I have my own proverb to go with the original Japanese proverb above: The hammer usually misses the nail. What I mean is not that the critics of the nail sticking out don’t wound their target, for there are a great many people who have been deeply wounded by blow of the hammer. Rather, what I mean is that the criticism — that is, hot, violent, hasty criticism — is so often misplaced. It doesn’t hit the nail on the head. Again, I’m not talking about deliberate, careful or thoughtful criticism here. Unthinking criticism misses the most fundamental fact of the nail’s sticking out. It’s actually not about a moral position or even one person’s rightness and another’s wrongness. It’s just about the fact that the nail is sticking out; that it is not, by definition, on the side of the hammer. That is all. That is why the hammer (the untruth of the crowd) misses the nail (the truth of the individual human subject).
Most of all, my point here is that people’s biases and reactions mostly have very little to do with some or other so-called rationality or reasonability. People’s biases, especially their in-group/out-group biases, are simply driven my mimetic desire: that shared desire that, in collective flashes of automatic mirror neurons, brings people together. It’s not generally about what is better or worse, but about allegiance and that age-old mimetic question: Are you with us or against us? If we fail to see the mimetic drive of the crowd, we are likely to get caught up in it; we are likely to live in the untruth of the way of the hammer.
One philosopher who came so close to recognizing the untruth of the hammer was a philosopher who used the hammer (albeit the literal one this time) as his primary example for how we live in the world. Martin Heidegger, in Being and Time, said that normally we have a posture towards things that is ready-to-hand rather than present-at-hand. What he meant was that in picking up the hammer, we do so with a kind of ready sense of what it is for and how it is used. We are not, in other words, concentrating on its presence and its hammerish attributes — it’s handle and the metal bit at the top. But this same Heidegger, who recognized this ready-to-hand quality of our posture towards being, saw the untruth of the crowd as something utterly removed from the experience of the individual so much so that he saw the crowd as the quintessential example of living unauthentically. Nevertheless, failing to see that he too could be influenced by the crowd, he embraced, to an alarming degree, the ideology of Germany’s Nazi party. He failed to see all the ways that the hammer was actually broken.
But, alas, the failure of people to see the mimetic nature of crowds and their tendency to fall in unthinkingly with the grove of the masses is as common today as it was back then. There will be millions of examples out there from every corner of the globe, every tribe, religion and language; but I thought I’d pick one out that suits the season of Lent (in the Christian calendar) that we are now in. It will probably a contentious example for many of my religious, evangelical Christian friends, but that is precisely what makes it a helpful example. Just a week or two ago, the author Rob Bell when discussing a book that he and his wife Kristen had written with Oprah Winfrey, claimed that he thinks that the Christian Church is moments away from embracing gay marriage.
The liberals must have cheered, but the conservatives cringed before proceeding to freak the hell out about Bell’s audacity and (so-called) heresy. Never before, by the way, has this kind of sexual politics been a matter of religious orthodoxy in this way. Anyway, I don’t know how it happened that I got there — I think someone posted a link on Facebook — but I visited the site of a particular Christian magazine and the labels that were thrown at Bell in the comments section were fairly astonishing. He was called a false prophet more times than I could count, as well as an apostate and even servant of Satan. The first thing that occurred to me was that Bell is in good company. The Jesus that Bell aligns himself with was criticised, among other things, for being a drunkard, blasphemer, friend of reprobates, and a prophet in league with the devil (Luke 5.21, 7.34, 11.15).
Actually, Bell has gotten off rather lightly, I think, if you think of what Jesus went through. One of the great culprits in this massive upheaval is found in what can be called commonsense morality. What I mean is that all of us have a sense, based on where we come from, of what is obviously right. But that doesn’t mean we have good or even legitimate reason for thinking so (“The bible tells me so” is not a reason, by the way, just an appeal to an authority that happens also to be throughly complex and even confusing, as those who have actually read it will understand). Still, the main culprit is not what people think but how they interact, always caught in the vortex of mimetic desire.
I have no doubt that there are some responses to Bell worth looking at somewhere on the internet, but they were not to be found in that article or in the comments that followed. It was all just anger and fury, hellfire and brimstone. No one on that forum asked how Bell, as a guy with quite impressive theological training and who openly affirms the truth of every item on the Apostle’s creed, as well as many other aspects of orthodox Christianity, could arrive at a conclusion that challenges a norm that people hold as somehow sacred. No one stopped to wonder if same sex relationships are really as big a deal in the Christian bible as people are making it out to be (they’re not) or if the kind of same sex relationships written about in the bible are precisely what we have today (again, they’re really not, if you take historical context seriously). No one in the mob did their homework, because that’s not what mobs do. They just jumped in and hurled insults and hatred at a man who, to me at least, seems like a pretty decent guy; a guy who comes across as thoroughly kind and generous-spirited even when he is being attacked so viciously by people who call themselves Christians. The hammer just came down because a nail happened to be sticking out. And, of course, as it so often does, the hammer missed completely.
It missed something that is so fundamental that it’s actually surprising just how often it is overlooked: that the central and most important contribution of Christian theology to ethics in general in the world today is its stance against the mindless, angry mob. Christianity, if it is to be read through the teachings of the figure at the centre of its epistemology, must be understood as a critique of the hammer. As a corollary, it is also a defense of the nail that has found itself sticking out. Whenever Jesus is confronted with a mob, he resists the urge to join in their hammering, even when that means utterly contravening the laws that they believe in. Take, for instance, John 8, which describes a scene in which a bunch of people are about to execute a woman by stoning because she had been caught in adultery. What people tend to overlook is that there is no precedent in the entire Jewish law that would allow him to step out in the way that he did (see Deuteronomy 22.22 and Leviticus 20.10). As far as the law was concerned, forgiveness was only reserved for minor offenses, not major ones like adultery. But here Jesus quite brazenly broke the law. He effectively, actively, denounced some of what the bible agrees with. (See, I told you, “The bible tells me so” isn’t an argument; the bible is, quite deliberately so, not a monolithic text).
In the process of dealing with that mob in John 8, Jesus says something pretty impressive. He says, “The person who is without sin should be the one to cast the first stone”. Now, it looks on the surface to be a fairly simple thing to say, but it’s really ingenious. In essence, he forces each person present to step outside of their mob mimeticism and their hive-mind stoning mentality and examine themselves as individuals. And the result is: no one can cast the first stone. Because they all realize that they, too, are far from perfect. You see, in that culture, one sin was not worse than another. Every sin — Francis Spufford in his amazing book Unapologetic: Why Christianity Still Makes Emotional Sense defines sin so accurately and colourfully as the “Human Propensity to Fuck Things Up” — every sin was an indication of being disconnected from Goodness Itself, which was condemnation enough. In that moment that Jesus calls everyone to be present to themselves, they are forced to think of themselves outside the hammer of culture, as individual nails. And in that moment, there is peace. Mob violence is averted.
But the thing is, it wasn’t a peace that would last for the Prince of Peace. Because Jesus did this sort of extremely bold thing so often that he stuck out a little too much. Actually, he stuck out a lot. And the result, we know, was his crucifixion. The hammer wanted a few nails to hammer down, so it did this right through his wrists and feet after one of the most brutal torturing sessions recorded in history. If there is powerful and significant critique against mimetic violence (even in its verbal and symbolic forms), or any kind of mob aggression, like the kind that has ganged up against people like Rob Bell or the gay people he is defending, it is must be the crucifixion of Jesus. The story makes it obvious: an innocent man is put to death because he sticks out, not because he is wrong. In fact, again, his guilt or innocence on the crimes he is accused of have nothing to do with his execution. He is killed by a mob because he is on the side of the minority.
Jesus said some words that discredit pretty much every person who buys into the mob mentality that picks on one person in the name of the crowd. Jesus said that people will know who his disciples are by the way they love each other. He certainly didn’t say that they’ll know who his disciples are by their perfect adherence to heteronormativity. And, anyway, this is the same man who said that we should love our enemies; that is, we should love even those who don’t fit with our agenda. That sort of wisdom, to me, seems sorely needed today, especially by those who think that the point of believing in the Transcendent is to have some big Other (to borrow Lacan’s name for that false god who is really just a projection of human legalism) to support their own expanding egos. To me it seems that this season of Lent is about something else. It’s about the fact that the Transcendent is the absence of ego, the denial of self and even a surrender. It is a surrender that is expressed in simple actions like giving up chocolate or coffee or some digital addiction; the Divine affects, by definition, a glorious, loving, life-giving freedom from the lie of the crowd. But it does this by revealing the truth of our natural imitation of the desires of others. In other words, freedom from the crowd arrives only in the paradox of seeing that we are the hammer and those who disagree with us may be our next victim-nails. It is only when we discover how we have been complicit in the crowd, that we are free to genuinely love and care for those who have been shunned by the crowd.
Of course, the proverb can be taken as a complement alongside another Japanese proverb, which says that envy is the companion of honour: if you stand out you’re bound to be met with criticism and resistance; and some of that criticism and resistance may be thoroughly unpleasant, or even violent. But this is ultimately not because you’re simply a loser in the eyes of the critics. Rather, the chances are that you’re on the side of the extraordinary. You’re doing something few others would dare to do. The hammer tries to degrade the nail because it finds the nail threatening.
This is not to say that the hammer that comes down on the nail is always wrong. Criminals who get punished for crimes have been met with the hammer of justice precisely because they have stepped outide of what is legal. The hammer in this instance can be very right, unless the law is wrong that is. And, yes, the law can be wrong. This is why we must call the law into question as often as we can, not to rebel against it but to check that it still serves justice. Nevertheless, it is not this kind of critical, careful legal hammering that I am primarily concerned with here. My concern is with the kind of hammer that comes down unreasonably, hastily, angrily and vindictively. This is the kind of hammering I have a problem with.
And to help to express my problem with this kind of hammering, I have my own proverb to go with the original Japanese proverb above: The hammer usually misses the nail. What I mean is not that the critics of the nail sticking out don’t wound their target, for there are a great many people who have been deeply wounded by blow of the hammer. Rather, what I mean is that the criticism — that is, hot, violent, hasty criticism — is so often misplaced. It doesn’t hit the nail on the head. Again, I’m not talking about deliberate, careful or thoughtful criticism here. Unthinking criticism misses the most fundamental fact of the nail’s sticking out. It’s actually not about a moral position or even one person’s rightness and another’s wrongness. It’s just about the fact that the nail is sticking out; that it is not, by definition, on the side of the hammer. That is all. That is why the hammer (the untruth of the crowd) misses the nail (the truth of the individual human subject).
Most of all, my point here is that people’s biases and reactions mostly have very little to do with some or other so-called rationality or reasonability. People’s biases, especially their in-group/out-group biases, are simply driven my mimetic desire: that shared desire that, in collective flashes of automatic mirror neurons, brings people together. It’s not generally about what is better or worse, but about allegiance and that age-old mimetic question: Are you with us or against us? If we fail to see the mimetic drive of the crowd, we are likely to get caught up in it; we are likely to live in the untruth of the way of the hammer.
One philosopher who came so close to recognizing the untruth of the hammer was a philosopher who used the hammer (albeit the literal one this time) as his primary example for how we live in the world. Martin Heidegger, in Being and Time, said that normally we have a posture towards things that is ready-to-hand rather than present-at-hand. What he meant was that in picking up the hammer, we do so with a kind of ready sense of what it is for and how it is used. We are not, in other words, concentrating on its presence and its hammerish attributes — it’s handle and the metal bit at the top. But this same Heidegger, who recognized this ready-to-hand quality of our posture towards being, saw the untruth of the crowd as something utterly removed from the experience of the individual so much so that he saw the crowd as the quintessential example of living unauthentically. Nevertheless, failing to see that he too could be influenced by the crowd, he embraced, to an alarming degree, the ideology of Germany’s Nazi party. He failed to see all the ways that the hammer was actually broken.
But, alas, the failure of people to see the mimetic nature of crowds and their tendency to fall in unthinkingly with the grove of the masses is as common today as it was back then. There will be millions of examples out there from every corner of the globe, every tribe, religion and language; but I thought I’d pick one out that suits the season of Lent (in the Christian calendar) that we are now in. It will probably a contentious example for many of my religious, evangelical Christian friends, but that is precisely what makes it a helpful example. Just a week or two ago, the author Rob Bell when discussing a book that he and his wife Kristen had written with Oprah Winfrey, claimed that he thinks that the Christian Church is moments away from embracing gay marriage.
The liberals must have cheered, but the conservatives cringed before proceeding to freak the hell out about Bell’s audacity and (so-called) heresy. Never before, by the way, has this kind of sexual politics been a matter of religious orthodoxy in this way. Anyway, I don’t know how it happened that I got there — I think someone posted a link on Facebook — but I visited the site of a particular Christian magazine and the labels that were thrown at Bell in the comments section were fairly astonishing. He was called a false prophet more times than I could count, as well as an apostate and even servant of Satan. The first thing that occurred to me was that Bell is in good company. The Jesus that Bell aligns himself with was criticised, among other things, for being a drunkard, blasphemer, friend of reprobates, and a prophet in league with the devil (Luke 5.21, 7.34, 11.15).
Actually, Bell has gotten off rather lightly, I think, if you think of what Jesus went through. One of the great culprits in this massive upheaval is found in what can be called commonsense morality. What I mean is that all of us have a sense, based on where we come from, of what is obviously right. But that doesn’t mean we have good or even legitimate reason for thinking so (“The bible tells me so” is not a reason, by the way, just an appeal to an authority that happens also to be throughly complex and even confusing, as those who have actually read it will understand). Still, the main culprit is not what people think but how they interact, always caught in the vortex of mimetic desire.
I have no doubt that there are some responses to Bell worth looking at somewhere on the internet, but they were not to be found in that article or in the comments that followed. It was all just anger and fury, hellfire and brimstone. No one on that forum asked how Bell, as a guy with quite impressive theological training and who openly affirms the truth of every item on the Apostle’s creed, as well as many other aspects of orthodox Christianity, could arrive at a conclusion that challenges a norm that people hold as somehow sacred. No one stopped to wonder if same sex relationships are really as big a deal in the Christian bible as people are making it out to be (they’re not) or if the kind of same sex relationships written about in the bible are precisely what we have today (again, they’re really not, if you take historical context seriously). No one in the mob did their homework, because that’s not what mobs do. They just jumped in and hurled insults and hatred at a man who, to me at least, seems like a pretty decent guy; a guy who comes across as thoroughly kind and generous-spirited even when he is being attacked so viciously by people who call themselves Christians. The hammer just came down because a nail happened to be sticking out. And, of course, as it so often does, the hammer missed completely.
It missed something that is so fundamental that it’s actually surprising just how often it is overlooked: that the central and most important contribution of Christian theology to ethics in general in the world today is its stance against the mindless, angry mob. Christianity, if it is to be read through the teachings of the figure at the centre of its epistemology, must be understood as a critique of the hammer. As a corollary, it is also a defense of the nail that has found itself sticking out. Whenever Jesus is confronted with a mob, he resists the urge to join in their hammering, even when that means utterly contravening the laws that they believe in. Take, for instance, John 8, which describes a scene in which a bunch of people are about to execute a woman by stoning because she had been caught in adultery. What people tend to overlook is that there is no precedent in the entire Jewish law that would allow him to step out in the way that he did (see Deuteronomy 22.22 and Leviticus 20.10). As far as the law was concerned, forgiveness was only reserved for minor offenses, not major ones like adultery. But here Jesus quite brazenly broke the law. He effectively, actively, denounced some of what the bible agrees with. (See, I told you, “The bible tells me so” isn’t an argument; the bible is, quite deliberately so, not a monolithic text).
In the process of dealing with that mob in John 8, Jesus says something pretty impressive. He says, “The person who is without sin should be the one to cast the first stone”. Now, it looks on the surface to be a fairly simple thing to say, but it’s really ingenious. In essence, he forces each person present to step outside of their mob mimeticism and their hive-mind stoning mentality and examine themselves as individuals. And the result is: no one can cast the first stone. Because they all realize that they, too, are far from perfect. You see, in that culture, one sin was not worse than another. Every sin — Francis Spufford in his amazing book Unapologetic: Why Christianity Still Makes Emotional Sense defines sin so accurately and colourfully as the “Human Propensity to Fuck Things Up” — every sin was an indication of being disconnected from Goodness Itself, which was condemnation enough. In that moment that Jesus calls everyone to be present to themselves, they are forced to think of themselves outside the hammer of culture, as individual nails. And in that moment, there is peace. Mob violence is averted.
But the thing is, it wasn’t a peace that would last for the Prince of Peace. Because Jesus did this sort of extremely bold thing so often that he stuck out a little too much. Actually, he stuck out a lot. And the result, we know, was his crucifixion. The hammer wanted a few nails to hammer down, so it did this right through his wrists and feet after one of the most brutal torturing sessions recorded in history. If there is powerful and significant critique against mimetic violence (even in its verbal and symbolic forms), or any kind of mob aggression, like the kind that has ganged up against people like Rob Bell or the gay people he is defending, it is must be the crucifixion of Jesus. The story makes it obvious: an innocent man is put to death because he sticks out, not because he is wrong. In fact, again, his guilt or innocence on the crimes he is accused of have nothing to do with his execution. He is killed by a mob because he is on the side of the minority.
Jesus said some words that discredit pretty much every person who buys into the mob mentality that picks on one person in the name of the crowd. Jesus said that people will know who his disciples are by the way they love each other. He certainly didn’t say that they’ll know who his disciples are by their perfect adherence to heteronormativity. And, anyway, this is the same man who said that we should love our enemies; that is, we should love even those who don’t fit with our agenda. That sort of wisdom, to me, seems sorely needed today, especially by those who think that the point of believing in the Transcendent is to have some big Other (to borrow Lacan’s name for that false god who is really just a projection of human legalism) to support their own expanding egos. To me it seems that this season of Lent is about something else. It’s about the fact that the Transcendent is the absence of ego, the denial of self and even a surrender. It is a surrender that is expressed in simple actions like giving up chocolate or coffee or some digital addiction; the Divine affects, by definition, a glorious, loving, life-giving freedom from the lie of the crowd. But it does this by revealing the truth of our natural imitation of the desires of others. In other words, freedom from the crowd arrives only in the paradox of seeing that we are the hammer and those who disagree with us may be our next victim-nails. It is only when we discover how we have been complicit in the crowd, that we are free to genuinely love and care for those who have been shunned by the crowd.
The failure of categories
Marlo Thomas has said, “There are two kinds of people in the world, givers and takers. The takers may eat better, but the givers sleep better”. Indira Gandhi offers a different categorisation, “There are two kinds of people: those who do the work and those who take the credit”. C. S. Lewis has yet another idea, namely that the two kinds of people include “those who say to God, ‘Thy will be done,’ and those to whom God says, ‘All right, then, have it your way’.” We could go on, of course, by noting that there are those who love to talk a lot and those who dislike people who love to talk a lot, or those who love to get up in the morning and those who think camels are one hump short; or those who think in binary and those who don’t know what binary is.
Perhaps there will be cases in which this obsession with endlessly splitting people up into dichotomies will be true. For the Heideggerian, there is the authentic self or the untruth of the crowd; for the Girardian, there are victims or victimisers (“Whoever can supply [the crowd] with illusions is easily their master. Whoever attempts to destroy their illusions is always their victim,” Gustav Le Bon has said); with regard to Ayn Rand, there are those who like her work and then those who are actually intelligent enough to see it for the stupid bunkum that it is. Still, we must feel on some level that there is also falsity here in this game of short division. I like Tom Robbins’s ironic quip in Still Life with Woodpecker that “[t]here are two kinds of people in this world: Those who believe there are two kinds of people in this world and those who are smart enough to know better”.
The father of public relations, Edward Bernays in his brilliant and somewhat unsettling book Crystallizing Public Opinion (1923) writes:
As soon as you divide people up into two groups, and set up clear distinctions that suggest that there really are only two kinds of people, you have (as Bernays has noted) violence, or at least the conditions for violence. And if you, like me, are not a fan of violence, then it may be worthwhile understanding how crowds come to view things in such sharp, contrasting terms. I’m not sure I can solve the riddle completely, but I have a simple suggestion: I think it has to do with the fact that calling attention to anything forces that thing to become a kind of absolute (or stereotype) in the minds of the people of any audience. There are a number of cognitive biases at work here: the ambiguity affect, the availability cascade, the contrast effect, the distinction bias, essentialism, the focusing effect, as well as a number of others. The main point is this: every emphasis is an overemphasis. Take the last sentence as a case in point.
I think it’s the job of sane and sensitive souls to utterly refuse any trend towards reductionism. This, mind you, is not an easy thing to do. Still, perhaps a good place to start is by assuming, right off the bat, that every label we’ve ever used to describe ourselves or someone else is automatically wrong because of what it emphasises and therefore overemphasises. We should be aware of what the French philosopher Alain Badiou calls the problem of “nominal occlusions”, which causes one term or name in a truth procedure to occlude and thereby possibly even obliterate another. When calling a person gay or straight, you define them by their sexuality only and thus fail to account for them as people. When you refer to them by their political allegiances, you neglect their personal affections and non-political agendas; when you delineate their being strictly along the lines of their faith or epistemological claims, you neglect all kinds of other things that are too subtle to even mention. When we dish labels out too confidently, we fall into the trap of thinking that our conscious articulations fully account for who we are. Because every assertion is a diversion.
This is why I find the promotion of a loss of identity in Christian theology fascinating, which most Christians I know don’t take seriously at all. It is only by losing your self, that is by losing your commitment to strict labels and rigid articulations, that you are free to be fully human. St. Paul, in his letter to the Galatians, sets up a fairly brilliant and subversive delineation that I find quite helpful: he says that those “in Christ”, that is, who participate in the way of self-abnegation and the acceptance of the pure Grace of Divine Presence (Pure Gift, Pure Surprise), are “neither Jew (religious insider), nor Gentile (religious outsider), nor slave nor free; nor is there male and female” (Galatians 3.28). It’s not that these categories cease to exist, but rather that they are not ultimately what defines people. In fact, people cannot be defined at all. We have, today, other labels that we may want to apply this: there is neither atheist nor theist, Christian nor Muslim, Protestant nor Catholic, Calvinist nor Methodist, gay nor straight, elite nor mob, capitalist nor communist, etc. These are not the terms that define anyone. They are the terms that really only fictionalise reality and turn it into something utterly palatable. But reality is not palatable or easily digested. It arrests and it undermines. It gets under our skin. It is our skin.
Surprisingly, this double-negation — neither this nor that — is not a negation of labels in the end, but in fact is a deeper affirmation of them as limited markers of what is real and true. There are indeed men but they are not just men, and there are women but their womanhood is not the sum total of who they are. There are feminists and chauvinists, but they are people first. The problem with affirming the label without also negating it too is that that loving embrace of inclusion itself so easily gets excluded. Violence, whether real or symbolic, becomes the norm in the process. Of course, I think we should recognise that categorisations are good as pathways but we should simultaneously see that they are absolutely rubbish as judgments. Categories as judgments are, in their own dualistic way, a kind of violence against ourselves and others when we take them more seriously than the complex and multifaceted realities that they are trying so hard to refer to.
Perhaps there will be cases in which this obsession with endlessly splitting people up into dichotomies will be true. For the Heideggerian, there is the authentic self or the untruth of the crowd; for the Girardian, there are victims or victimisers (“Whoever can supply [the crowd] with illusions is easily their master. Whoever attempts to destroy their illusions is always their victim,” Gustav Le Bon has said); with regard to Ayn Rand, there are those who like her work and then those who are actually intelligent enough to see it for the stupid bunkum that it is. Still, we must feel on some level that there is also falsity here in this game of short division. I like Tom Robbins’s ironic quip in Still Life with Woodpecker that “[t]here are two kinds of people in this world: Those who believe there are two kinds of people in this world and those who are smart enough to know better”.
The father of public relations, Edward Bernays in his brilliant and somewhat unsettling book Crystallizing Public Opinion (1923) writes:
“Society is not divided into two groups, although it seems so to many. Some see modern society divided into capital and labor. The feminist sees the world divided into men and women. The hungry man sees the rich and the poor. The missionary sees the heathen and the faithful. If society were divided into two groups, and no more, then change would come about only through violent upheaval.”It is a brilliant observation that I think highlights so perfectly the nature of ideology: it is that which tends to split up and divide things as a means for control. Ideologists conceive of the world through stark contrasts even when they must surely know that their perceptions are limited; can they not see that there are not just shades of grey but colours of all kinds that also need to be taken into account? Nevertheless, for reasons that I’m not entirely clear on, nuance is usually the first thing to go when ideas crystallize into articulations. “Tyranny,” Albert Maysles suggests, “is the deliberate removal of nuance”. Perhaps, though, any removal of nuance is tyrannical and not just the deliberate kind.
As soon as you divide people up into two groups, and set up clear distinctions that suggest that there really are only two kinds of people, you have (as Bernays has noted) violence, or at least the conditions for violence. And if you, like me, are not a fan of violence, then it may be worthwhile understanding how crowds come to view things in such sharp, contrasting terms. I’m not sure I can solve the riddle completely, but I have a simple suggestion: I think it has to do with the fact that calling attention to anything forces that thing to become a kind of absolute (or stereotype) in the minds of the people of any audience. There are a number of cognitive biases at work here: the ambiguity affect, the availability cascade, the contrast effect, the distinction bias, essentialism, the focusing effect, as well as a number of others. The main point is this: every emphasis is an overemphasis. Take the last sentence as a case in point.
I think it’s the job of sane and sensitive souls to utterly refuse any trend towards reductionism. This, mind you, is not an easy thing to do. Still, perhaps a good place to start is by assuming, right off the bat, that every label we’ve ever used to describe ourselves or someone else is automatically wrong because of what it emphasises and therefore overemphasises. We should be aware of what the French philosopher Alain Badiou calls the problem of “nominal occlusions”, which causes one term or name in a truth procedure to occlude and thereby possibly even obliterate another. When calling a person gay or straight, you define them by their sexuality only and thus fail to account for them as people. When you refer to them by their political allegiances, you neglect their personal affections and non-political agendas; when you delineate their being strictly along the lines of their faith or epistemological claims, you neglect all kinds of other things that are too subtle to even mention. When we dish labels out too confidently, we fall into the trap of thinking that our conscious articulations fully account for who we are. Because every assertion is a diversion.
This is why I find the promotion of a loss of identity in Christian theology fascinating, which most Christians I know don’t take seriously at all. It is only by losing your self, that is by losing your commitment to strict labels and rigid articulations, that you are free to be fully human. St. Paul, in his letter to the Galatians, sets up a fairly brilliant and subversive delineation that I find quite helpful: he says that those “in Christ”, that is, who participate in the way of self-abnegation and the acceptance of the pure Grace of Divine Presence (Pure Gift, Pure Surprise), are “neither Jew (religious insider), nor Gentile (religious outsider), nor slave nor free; nor is there male and female” (Galatians 3.28). It’s not that these categories cease to exist, but rather that they are not ultimately what defines people. In fact, people cannot be defined at all. We have, today, other labels that we may want to apply this: there is neither atheist nor theist, Christian nor Muslim, Protestant nor Catholic, Calvinist nor Methodist, gay nor straight, elite nor mob, capitalist nor communist, etc. These are not the terms that define anyone. They are the terms that really only fictionalise reality and turn it into something utterly palatable. But reality is not palatable or easily digested. It arrests and it undermines. It gets under our skin. It is our skin.
Surprisingly, this double-negation — neither this nor that — is not a negation of labels in the end, but in fact is a deeper affirmation of them as limited markers of what is real and true. There are indeed men but they are not just men, and there are women but their womanhood is not the sum total of who they are. There are feminists and chauvinists, but they are people first. The problem with affirming the label without also negating it too is that that loving embrace of inclusion itself so easily gets excluded. Violence, whether real or symbolic, becomes the norm in the process. Of course, I think we should recognise that categorisations are good as pathways but we should simultaneously see that they are absolutely rubbish as judgments. Categories as judgments are, in their own dualistic way, a kind of violence against ourselves and others when we take them more seriously than the complex and multifaceted realities that they are trying so hard to refer to.
Stereotype Be
There’s a parable, a little reminiscent of that classic Disney cartoon Lambert the Sheepish Lion, about how a chicken farmer found an egg near the barn. Thinking it must be a chicken’s egg, he took it and put it into the nest of one of the hens in the barn. Only later did he discover that an eaglet, and not a chick, had hatched from that stray egg. Wanting to see what would happen, the farmer didn’t intervene.
And so the eaglet grew up with the chicks, scratching at the ground and clucking as they did. Then, one day when he was very old, he saw a bird flying high above him. “Who’s that?” he asked one of his friends. “Oh,” said the chicken to his odd-looking brother, “that’s the king of the birds, the eagle. He belongs high above us in the sky. We, on the other hand, belong on the ground because we’re chickens.” So the eagle lived and died a chicken, because that’s what he thought he was.
I really like this story because, apart from the delight of imagining an eagle acting like a chicken, it hits upon a very profound truth: those who live without awareness adopt the stance of the crowd. Put a little differently, those who live without awareness become stereotypes. Okay, I know, that’s a dose of some serious full-frontal pessimism, but I’ve seen this enough in other people, and even in myself from time to time, to know just how true it is.
When people are unable to find a sense of their own true selves — their own sense (I think) of genuine spiritual connection outside of the junk-food spirituality that gets offered up in mindless religious ritual or consumerism — when people are unable to live in the reality of that which is truly transcendent, they become locked in the gravity of values and patterns that they wholeheartedly believe they have chosen of their own free will, but which are obviously just the values of those most proximate to them.
We call this stereotype formation peer pressure, but you could also call it church, or business culture, or drinking culture, or a bachelor party, or sports enthusiasm, or gym, or liberalism or conservatism, or any number of other spaces and formations built to serve and preserve and not disturb the collective mind. When people find themselves simply flowing with the groove of the group, the “intelligence is defeated”, Simone Weil suggests.
Stereotypes are almost laughably easy to pin down: the left-brained engineer/doctor/banker who wears his girlfriend like a piece of jewellery without once taking any heed of her intelligence or personality; or the young designer obsessed with being unique but then who ends up simply fitting in to hipster culture and anything else that smacks of faux authenticity; or the guy who pursues a career in something that will make a lot of money because, well, isn’t that what it means to be successful? All these labels are wrong and limited and irritating, I know, but the point is that stereotypes live into labels. They can’t see out of them.
All of this makes me think of Anthony de Mello’s contention that “[m]ost people, even though they don’t know it, are asleep. They’re born asleep, they live asleep, they marry in their sleep, they breed children in their sleep, they die in their sleep without ever waking up.” I’m not saying at all that I’ve reached some kind of weird enlightened position from where I can tell everyone how to live. I’m not that guy. Still, I try as much as possible to live deliberately; to think through the things that I accept or do not accept or do not yet understand. I insist, for my own sanity and wellbeing, on stepping away from the crowd or the conversation in order to reflect upon and contemplate they way that things actually are. I try to get behind how things appear. I like to challenge the status quo without merely reverting to some stupid anti-stereotyping rampage. After all, merely opposing the stereotype will land us, simply, in the unenviable position of living out yet another stereotype. That’s where we get goth or emo or metalhead culture from — or hippies, or fundamentalists for that matter. Almost everyone is in the business of trying to define themselves by what they are not instead of simply taking the trouble to make choices based on direct engagement with the possibilities before them.
I once heard a feminist talking about the problems with the feminism that she used to adopt; a feminism that was all about career and very anti domestic life. In other words, in her own state of unawareness, she had merely adopted those things that were typically desired by men. She then pointed out that she has since learned to affirm any responsible decision, including choices that may seem simply typical or stereotypical. If a woman chooses to follow the so-called formula of marrying and being a stay-at-home mom, but does so deliberately, then that should be celebrated. Because, I agree, any responsible, thoughtful choice should be celebrated. You can look exactly like the stereotype without actually being the stereotype. That is what awareness is. Being free from a thing means you can choose that thing too because it involves recognising that your personhood is not going to be defined by that thing.
I know so many people, though, who are caught up in living out the narrative of some big Other (to borrow Lacan’s term for society’s unwritten rule book). I know so many who talk about what they ought to do or what path they should take. And I want to say, and often do, “Where is that ought coming from?” or “Why should you do anything?” We can, I believe (because it is something I experience), act out of our being, rather than falling into the Satrean mistake of assuming that we need to create our essence through a flurry of activity. To those friends I know who keep on living out the negative narratives generated by their contexts, I just want to say, with all the grace and compassion that I can muster: You really don’t have to live like this. You can choose. You can wake up. You can reflect, pause. You can contemplate your existence as it really is. You’re an eagle, for God’s sake, so stop acting like a chicken.
Some non-religious thoughts on Easter
In his book The Crowd, Gustave le Bon notes that “[t]he masses have never thirsted after truth. They turn aside from evidence that is not to their taste, preferring to deify error, if error seduces them. Whoever can supply them with illusions is easily their master; whoever attempts to destroy their illusions is always their victim.”
It’s interesting to me that two people in the twentieth century, Adolf Hitler and Edward Bernays, were particularly influenced by le Bon’s book. Hitler would use the tools discussed by le Bon to develop one of the most powerful propaganda machines the world has ever seen to help establish a totalitarian state, and Bernays would use those same tools to invent consumerism and a world in which enough is never enough. They were both, in effect, people who supplied the crowd with the illusions they wanted.
However, today, being Good Friday, marks the remembrance of a strange historical event, when one man in particular, having refused to live his life giving people their illusions, proved the chilling correctness of the second part of le Bon’s pronouncement. He became the victim of the mob. He was crucified by the first century equivalent of the Church and State — the religious and political orders of his day. His death still stands, I think, as the most astonishing critique of power ever, because, despite the fact that by all accounts he knew what was coming, he still elected to side with truth over illusion. In his case, the truth was that love should outlive the law and that mercy should triumph over judgment — ideas that many religious and political establishments today still fail to grasp. He readily spoke out against meritocracy and patriarchy, and also especially against the way that the big shots were abusing the little guys. But although his critique of power and ideology continued throughout his life, it was nowhere more profoundly demonstrated than in this laying down of his life. There he showed, by walking into the trap rather than running from it, what power always does: it corrupts and kills.
Jesus died because of the violence in the hearts of many who couldn’t take having their illusions challenged; those who insisted that retribution is better than forgiveness, or who lived as if success and self-assertion are better than humility or that meritocracy is better than underserved, gratuitous love. When I look at the story of Jesus, even without the eyes of faith, I see something that’s difficult to completely ignore: he lived and then died in the firm conviction that forgiveness, humility and love were better than the alternatives that were promoted by religious fundamentalists and political powers. He therefore continuously responded in a way that would probably be regarded as miraculous even by the most hardened skeptic: he offered love and forgiveness to every single person who inflicted pain on him or, like his very own disciples, abandoned him: “Father, forgive them,” he said, “for they are unaware of what they’re doing.” He even proved that his encouragement for people to love their enemies wasn’t just an impossible ideal. He actually showed people what it looks like.
Christians still debate the meaning of Jesus’ death, and its safe to say that those debates will continue. So that’s a debate I’m not even going to begin to answer here. But at its simplest, the image of a holy man dying because of the mob’s attachment to their own illusions is one that still evokes empathy. And maybe this is the most significant thing about it. It is significant because we are most human when we are empathetic. We are most human when we care about the victims in this world. We are most human, that is, when we step away from the mob and look at those that we have belittled and shamed and turned away. I don’t think you need to be a Christian, really, to be able to see how profound that is. It tells us that any religious or political triumphalism is undoubtedly misplaced.
If Jesus was just a guy not some divinity, his death would still be of some importance for the world we live in. Actually, it was the thing that his disciples tended to focus on even more than his resurrection. Why? Well, I think it’s because Jesus claimed that looking at him and seeing the way he loved others was just about as good as looking at the face of God. And if that same love could still be tangible as he was being tortured to death, then there’s still this strange possibility that the Divine is not just some weird thing out there, far away and indifferent like a cosmic vending machine or, worse, a cosmic slot machine. The Divine, as Jesus modelled it, is something right in the midst of the human: something located not in temples or in throne rooms, but in the very mess of our existence; even in the worst of our life experiences. The Transcendent is possible, then, not just in our overcoming but in our not-overcoming. “Lucky are the spiritually bankrupt and the victimised,” Jesus effectively said in his famous Sermon on the Mount, “for the permeation of the perfectly good, true and beautiful is no less accessible to them.”
Is it ethical to live forever?
Sometimes I like to amuse myself by toying with silly questions and then imagining that I might actually be able to answer them. So the other day, I started throwing the question of whether it’s ethical to live forever around in my head.
It’s a funny question because of the speculation required to answer it. No one knows for sure whether there’s an afterlife. No one has YouTubed the apocalypse. And books and movies like Heaven is for real are enough to make me want to believe that heaven is a place that should be avoided entirely, especially if it’s got people in it who believe that heaven is for real.
My silly question above, however, doesn’t really refer to heaven. I’m asking whether it’s ethical to live forever, not whether we get to do such a thing. Of course, no philosopher looks at a question point blank and accepts its terms ipso facto. So even when I ask questions like this one, its terms need to be very carefully understood. Clearly, this question implies another more fundamental question: Is it ethical to live at all? The answer to that must be yes. If we didn’t believe that, we’d all go around promoting suicide left, right and centre. This would be horrific and ridiculous, except in the case of politicians, who should even now be encouraged to believe that their chances of being voted into power depend entirely on their ability to off themselves before elections begin. Only this fantasy is preferable to our currently reality, where most politicians in power, I’m sorry to say, are actually among the living.
Although, allow me to quickly contradict this tomfoolery: Existence, as such, is a good thing, and so, once again, the question of whether it is ethical to live at all must be met with a resounding yes. This, to use a frivolous case study, is where abortion and euthanasia supporters tend to get a little confused. Especially the more dogmatic among them start to conflate the issue of quality of life with the value of life itself. They’ll use soft language about living with dignity or dying with dignity, when they’re really just talking about not living at all. They’re the ones saying that if life isn’t going to be totally pleasurable because such people are usually Epicureans, then it’s worth preventing or ending prematurely. This, I think, is to mix up the issue of suffering with the issue of living. No doubt, these things are connected, but they are also not the same thing.
To confuse the issue of life with what life supports is to confuse the host with the disease. To end suffering by ending a life, then, is tantamount to solving the problem by denying people the ability to deal with the problem. It cures the cancer by killing the patient. That’s like trying to solve the problem of a lack of education by preventing people from going to school or university, or like solving hunger by sewing shut the lips of the hungry. What would happen if we dealt with all problems with this kind of non-sequitur logic?
Of course, if we were to have the ability to live forever, other issues would come into play, like whether the actions of the average immortal person are generally ethical, or how to look after those who are terminally ill or not, or how to support the unexpectedly pregnant and their unwanted offspring. But those things will be at issue rather than the issue of life itself. The question of what kind of existence we are going to have while living forever is still important, but it too is a different question. Life itself remains, in itself, a very good thing. And so living forever, if it were possible, would be a good thing as well.
I know it may sound like a radical thing to say, and I’m not sure that I’ve ended this debate in my head so please be patient with my rather final-seeming conclusion, but I think that an eternal existence even in perpetual torment is still preferable to no existence at all. Yes, annihilation would end suffering, but it would also end the possibility of love amidst the pain, of human connection, of solidarity and a million other things that aren’t just banal or indifferent but frighteningly, terrifyingly good. I’m not saying that the bad stuff is all okay, just that, to me, it’s not a great idea to get the corruption and degeneration of things confused with the things themselves.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)