Sunday, January 3, 2016

To the fragile

I know you’ve been thinking it all along, but I’ll say it anyway: W Somerset Maugham’s The razor’s edge is a very aptly titled novel. It tells the story about a young man who sets out in search of the Absolute, and while I don’t agree with the conclusions that this protagonist reaches, the title of the novel still manages to capture the delicate nature of his quest. To seek truth — to find wholeness and a sense of wellbeing — is to be balanced on a razor’s edge. You see, the absolute itself, however we may try to define it and however we encounter the ways that our words fail to capture it, seems to also be fragile; it is, perhaps, something discovered in fleeting glances, in ideas that escape representation, in brief experiences of the sublime, in gestures, in clouds that bend and shift to the whims of the wind. It is often most present when we feel that we have lost it, and somehow most absent when we claim to have a handle on it. Perhaps it is when we understand the fragility of this absolute, or at least the fragility of our ability to be present to it, that we can come to appreciate most profoundly what it means to be human.
William Desmond, a remarkable philosopher whose work I have been grappling with recently, presents this very simple but very profound idea that ‘to be’ — that is, to ‘take a stand’ on being human (to risk a Heideggerian phrase) — is to be ‘in the between’. It’s a simple idea — an idea that I may unfairly over-simplify here — that has some very profound and illuminating implications for how we might understand our experience within what is often a traumatically complex world. It presents us with the truth that our ordinary experience of the world is paradoxical: this is to say that existence is riddled with riddles that are always and forever dancing in, through and beyond the known.
Desmond writes that “[o]ur understanding of what it means to be comes to definition in a complex interplay between indetermination and determination, transcendence and immanence, otherness and sameness, difference and identity”. This “betweenness” is grappled with and taken in most elegantly through a somewhat mystical stance towards being that Desmond refers to as the metaxological, which is “[a] sense of plurally intermediated relatedness between identity and difference, offering a renewal of the openness of this between, where identity exceeds its own self-mediating and difference can define robust otherness irreducible to any dialectical self-mediation” (see Desmond, Desire, dialectic and otherness, 2014). I know there are a lot of big ideas here that I can’t quite get into in the kind of detail I would like, but suffice it to say that this metaxological stance is a stance of openness; it stresses “the mediated community of mind and being” and “calls attention to a pluralized mediation beyond closed self-mediation from the side of the same, and hospitable to the mediation of the other, or transcendent, out of its own otherness”. In other words, the metaxological sense “keeps open the spaces of otherness in the between, and it does not domesticate the ruptures that shake the complacencies of our mediations of being” (see The William Desmond Reader, edited by Christopher Ben Simpson).
This open relationship to otherness — this openness to that which escapes our attempts at domesticating reality and which leaves us often gasping for breath in the face of the tumultuous — is beautifully captured in the philosophy of John O’Donohue (especially in his book Eternal echoes). O’Donohue places our experience of being in the tension between longing and belonging. We all long for things — we are hungry, needy, lustful; we are seekers, trippers, askers, fumblers, fallforwarders. We all need to belong — to feel as if we, and the things we experience, fit. If we were only in a state of longing, we would all be addicts — always consuming, but never sated. We would be Erysichthonites and flounderabouters. But if we were only in a state of forced belonging, we’d all be fundamentalists and psychotics who try to control reality through language, actions and various permutations of bureaucratic institutionalization. To avoid these extremes, we need to have this tension between longing and belonging maintained in ourselves: we need a sense of adventure and a sense of the comfort of home, as Chesterton says. It is only in this tension that the “original astonishment” of being (as Desmond calls it) can be reclaimed (although, perhaps, this tension may also produce more perplexity than it does astonishment).
But, as I said, we’re on a razor’s edge. Our desire to stay in a right relationship with these tensions — with this delicate sense of the between — is disrupted almost continuously, both by the wondrous and the terrible, both by the awe-inspiring and the dread-inciting. We may tell stories and myths to stress belonging, but in so doing may also forget that we are hungry. Or we may wander around in the desert looking for water while forgetting that we’ve got everything we need right there with us. We are so easily thrown off kilter.
I know that you are like me in that you too are fragile. And I want to offer just this one thing that I have found to be true in what has turned out to be a beautiful-difficult year — a year of death and new life, of grieving great losses and celebrating new arrivals: the more we try to balance ourselves on this razor’s edge, the more likely it is that we will simply fall off. Because the absolute or the divine is not ultimately something we find. Rather, it is something that finds us when we let ourselves simply be — when we breathe, when we try to indicate towards that which cannot be named, when we accept that there are mysteries that we will never fully grasp. This, it turns out is grace. To be inbetween is, ultimately, insofar as I can tell, grace. I know it’s a difficult word to explain, but I think Paul Tillich (in Shaking the foundations) gets pretty close:
“Grace strikes us when we are in great pain and restlessness. It strikes us when we walk through the dark valley of a meaningless and empty life. It strikes us when we feel that our separation is deeper than usual, because we have violated another life, a life which we loved, or from which we were estranged. It strikes us when our disgust for our own being, our indifference, our weakness, our hostility, and our lack of direction and composure have become intolerable to us. It strikes us when, year after year, the longed-for perfection of life does not appear, when the old compulsions reign within us as they have for decades, when despair destroys all joy and courage. Sometimes at that moment a wave of light breaks into our darkness, and it is as though a voice were saying: “You are accepted. You are accepted, accepted by that which is greater than you, and the name of which you do not know. Do not ask for the name now; perhaps you will find it later. Do not try to do anything now; perhaps later you will do much. Do not seek for anything; do not perform anything; do not intend anything. Simply accept the fact that you are accepted!” If that happens to us, we experience grace After such an experience we may not be better than before, and we may not believe more than before. But everything is transformed. In that moment, grace conquers sin, and reconciliation bridges the gulf of estrangement. And nothing is demanded of this experience, no religious or moral or intellectual presupposition, nothing but acceptance.
In the light of this grace we perceive the power of grace in our relation to others and to ourselves. We experience the grace of being able to look frankly into the eyes of another, the miraculous grace of reunion of life with life. We experience the grace of understanding each other’s words. We understand not merely the literal meaning of the words, but also that which lies behind them, even when they are harsh or angry. For even then there is a longing to break through the walls of separation. We experience the grace of being able to accept the life of another, even if it be hostile and harmful to us, for, through grace, we know that it belongs to the same Ground to which we belong, and by which we have been accepted. We experience the grace which is able to overcome the tragic separation of the sexes, of the generations, of the nations, of the races, and even the utter strangeness between man and nature. Sometimes grace appears in all these separations to reunite us with those to whom we belong. For life belong to life.
And in the light of this grace we perceive the power of grace in our relation to ourselves. We experience moments in which we accept ourselves, because we feel that we have been accepted by that which is greater than we.”

Ice buckets and mimetic moronism

There are a whole bunch of critics out there who have suggested that this Ice Bucket Challenge thing has gone too far. At least, this is what they suggested when this happened way back in 2014 when this was first published. But, what if it hasn’t gone far enough?
Maybe people should instead start randomly hacking off their own limbs with machetes before nominating others to do the same in order to promote an awareness of ALS, or some other major disease or cause. Or maybe people should start something called the Guillotine Challenge, whereby the French nation’s greatest contribution to Making Beheading Easy can team up with the internet’s formidable contribution to Making Stupidity Popular. At least such a use of sharp weaponry would allow people to identify more strongly with the genuinely traumatic state of those who are actually diagnosed with a terminal illness instead of trivializing it completely. The beheadings will, I think, also be quite appropriate symbolically speaking: they would mirror pretty much exactly what’s already happening out there in Internetland. If thine head causes you to be a moron, lop it off; for it is better to exit the Kingdom of This World a moron than to be accused of reasoning properly. 
My concerns with the ideological apparatus of the Ice Bucket Challenge, however, go further than merely observing its tendency to force an association between the truly terrible and the truly ridiculous. Although you know this already (or, at least, I hope you do), it’s worth looking again how the game works: (1) First, you get nominated by someone who both loves and hates you, (2) then you have twenty-four hours to douse yourself in ice-cube infested water or, (3) if you fail to comply with this bizarre condition, you need to then donate a sum of money to ALS research. (4) Finally, you get to nominate three other people to join in the fun (otherwise known as “fun”). I know people who have donated to the cause and doused themselves and I must say that I’m impressed: it’s proof enough that not knowing the rules of a game isn’t necessarily going to stop people from playing.
“Don’t think, just do it! Guillotines away!”
It’s pure mimetic desire, of course. People want what others want for no other reason than that others want it. There is a kind of invitation here (“Come on, join in!”) and a kind of injunction (Join in, or else!), but I’m pretty sure it’s the injunction that ultimately wins while the invitation cowers in the corner. One could even suggest that the simpler, dumber and less self-aware the individual subject, the more likely they’ll be to fall prey to this mimetic vortex (although, as Bill Gates among others has shown us, the intelligent are not exempt from this copy-cat behaviour; we are all, after all, driven by some form of mimetic desire). And this is not necessarily a bad thing.
As the desire escalates through various viral commandments and participations, the desire of others becomes, as far as I can tell, the desire of what Lacan calls the big Other. As Hendrik Bjerre and Carsten Laustsen note in their book The subject of politics: Slavoj Žižek’s political philosophy, “Desire, in Lacan’s words, is always the desire of the Other. What I desire is first and foremost to be desired by the [O]ther … [Thus, even] the most immediate private wish is therefore always already mediated by a kind of unconscious awareness of our relations to the [O]ther.” Lacan’s big Other is different from the Girardian notion of the other in that Girard is talking about actual individuals —people with souls and wills — whereas Lacan is talking about the a kind of unconscious network of rules that governs human relations.
The Other, in Lacanian terms, is constituted by the entire symbolic realm of human productions. It is manifest not only in language but in all the various hypotheses that exert any influence upon the Subject: society, law, social mores, taboos, norms, expectations, perceptions of time, the dominant logic of the tribe, etc. The Other, then, is the place where all signifiers are stored, the treasury of semiotic interlinkages. It is, of course, ‘unconscious’ — that is, it functions like the electromagnetic field operating upon liquid crystal to form letters: it pulls signifiers into place without any force of will. The Other does not exist — it is a fiction — and yet it functions.
This Other can be equated with ideology, which Mark Lilla describes beautifully, “An ideology … holds us in its grasp with an enchanting picture of reality. To follow the optical metaphor, ideology takes an undifferentiated visual field and brings it into focus, so that objects appear in a predetermined relation to each other.” Ideology makes it possible for the individual to mirror itself in society. So, when we look at the Ice Bucket Challenge, we recognise its ideological function as follows: it is what allows people to feel like they fit; that they comply, belong, conform.
We’re all individuals here, right?
We are all unique just like everyone else.
Bjerre and Laustsen carry on: “There does not, or at least certainly doesn’t have to be, any unequivocal conspiracy (a mastermind) behind the way that ideologies work on their subjects, but they nonetheless function and subjects largely orient themselves via an imagined coherence behind the actual events in society, or to put it another way: we behave as if there were a society. There is no society but it functions nonetheless.”
And this one manifestation of ideology that we’re looking at here works as follows: Most people opt for participating in the self-dousing, which may be interpreted thus: participants have no real interest in actively putting their money where their quivering-shivering mouths are. This is not to say that money hasn’t been raised. In fact, a hell of a lot of money has been raised. Well done, world. And, yes, some kind of awareness is raised, which is great — I’m not dead-set against the charity in all of this, and I’m not even against the fun, per se. But with this awareness of the Girardian other and the Lacanian Other in mind, I hope you see that there are ideological constraints that need to be reconsidered.
In particular, there is an ideological trap built into the rules: only two real options are offered. This is the trick of every kind of spurious benevolence. The rules stipulate that you either participate by getting wet or you participate by paying up. No genuine third option is offered, although one is implied: those who don’t participate are automatically spoilsports (Their reasons and motivations are irrelevant).  I’m not sure this is a fair game, because the rules work much like a totalitarian regime works.
Apart from this forced compliance, the rules also pronounce any other social, environmental and/or economic concerns well outside of the scope of the game. In this vortex, what really matters is ALS; what really matters is participating in the game. Precisely where the money goes and how it is used is not even vaguely at issue. Everything else, including saving clean drinking water in a drought-stricken world, is irrelevant. And, naturally, thinking about any of this is implicitly prohibited by the rules, which I am hereby rebelling against. The internet flattens people; turns us all into memes.
So I hereby nominate the internet to stop nominating people.
Although, perhaps this too is unfair. One of my students pointed out to me yesterday after I gave a lecture on this subject that the Ice Bucket Challenge creates a wonderful opportunity for camaraderie and friendship building. This may be partially true, but the rules of this game, unlike a genuine friendship, seem to be beyond negotiation. Thus, inevitably, I am not taking issue with all of this joyous camaraderie, nor am I at odds with the fact that a great deal of good has come of this. And even while I find the sheer volume of banal videos and images on the internet on this viral phenomenon troubling, not even this is the main concern for me.
My main concern is that the contingent is taken as absolute; the ideology is thus rendered as an immovable object. The invitation is replaced by a rather forceful set of parameters that basically communicate that human freedom itself irrelevant. We are part of the crowd, the team, the global village. This, of course, is true, but it is only one part of the truth. And by emphasizing only a part of the truth, only part of our humanity is taken into account; and we know from history that when this sort of thing happens, we are inevitably dehumanized.

Evolution made me do it!

This was originally published in December 2012, which was a while ago. I'm pretty sure some of my ideas have evolved since then...

I recently read a report that records how scientists have “proved” that women are naturally promiscuous because (as the explanation goes) it increases the likelihood of their conceiving and giving birth to healthy children. It has long been suggested that men are also naturally promiscuous and often resort to rape for the same reason. In other words, infidelity and sexual deviance are somehow genetic mechanisms that perpetuate the ‘survival of the fittest’ (This is TH Huxley’s phrase, not Darwin’s, contrary to popular belief). Apart from the troubling use of science to legitimate human idiocy and cruelty and also the failure of this theory to point out that promiscuity is also quite helpful for killing off people as in the case of HIV/AIDS among other STDs, it presents a problem that I don’t think gets enough attention, namely the problem that a great many scientists think that they understand what they mean when they claim that “evolution” makes things the way they are when it is obvious to me that they don’t.

To be utterly transparent, I have absolutely no problem with the theory of evolution at all insofar as it remains within the scientific paradigm. It is an elegant albeit unprovable theory with some very valid and plausible conclusions. But what I do have a problem with is the fact that so many people evoke it without understanding what it is actually about. What follows is an attempt to deal with this problematic understanding using Hume’s Razor, which helpfully splits isness from oughtness.

Evolution, as Darwin recorded it, was simply meant as a descriptive theory, which is why he never saw it as contradicting various faith claims about the meaning of life and the existence of God. Evolution describes not how or why things change, but simply that they do change. It notes that certain birds started off with short, stumpy beaks and ended up with slightly longer beaks and that such a transition, by chance and accident (emphatically not design), happened to be ‘good’ for said birds in the sense that it allowed them to reach pollen at the bottom of more elongated flowers. Those that didn’t adapt to such flowers would have had to look for other sources of food, or perish. Notice how Richard Dawkins puts it so eloquently: “Evolution is blind to a goal”. This is to say that evolution is not willfully aiming for anything; it simply happens; things work out in a certain way and cannot be said to be either good or bad. If people evolve to be dumber and with an extra set of arms or eyeballs, evolution wouldn’t care. The Huxleyan phrase “survival of the fittest” is therefore merely a means by which it is noted that those that don’t adapt tend not to survive. That is all.

But here is where the trouble comes in. Somewhere along the line, people (eager to feed into the modernist myth of progress) took “survival” to be a value judgment in evolutionary theory, rather than a simple description about the presence or absence of life. In other words, it was deemed that evolution “thinks” survival is better than its opposite. It was concluded that evolution “deems” survival “good” and death “bad”. And the worry here is that evolution is given a mind, a will, and a reason to promote various kinds of social Darwinism. But evolution does not, and in fact cannot be bothered one iota about how we do and do not survive and whether survival is perpetuated or not. Evolution is utterly, completely and thoroughly blind. Dawkins points out elsewhere that “our genes neither know nor care … we just dance to their music”. Do our genes care whether they live or die? Nope. Not one bit. Does evolution care whether the human race is perpetuated or diminished? Again, no.

Evolution begins and ends with a world that is simply stuff. It is material and therefore not in the least bit mindful. It is not meaningful or charged with hope or love or destiny. It is just stuff. As soon as we start to talk about survival as better or worse than dying out, we are no longer in the realm of science. We are then dealing with metaphysics and, yes, even religion. As soon as we insist that evolution has a mind and a will, we are no longer talking about a description of how things happen to have happened the way they happened; rather, we are talking about a particular kind of conceivable ‘god’. We are no longer working with empirical observations (not that evolution is truly empirical; let’s be honest, it is still a theory, albeit a very good one in the sense that the usual criteria of testability and repeatability do not apply), we are working with faith claims. At this point, unavoidably, we are fully immersed within the domain of ideology.

I know I am making a fairly brutal division between science and philosophy, but I think it is helpful for navigating what each brings to the table. I want the scientist to tell me what kind of poison will kill me; it is for my local metaphysician to determine whether or not I ought to be killed. The division of science and philosophy does not suggest that the two are incompatible, but just the opposite. They are compatible and even helpful insofar as they allow people to make decisions within the limitations of each discipline. And this should be pointed out even to people like Dawkins, who while being a brilliant scientist seems to me to have the philosophical finesse of a chainsaw. A scientist may be able to tell me about how the material world works, but I’d rather talk to a philosopher about whether or not it may actually have any meaning.

Pope Smoke and Fashion Addiction

The following was originally published way, way back, on March 13, 2013.

Jimmy Fallon, American late night TV host, had this to say on the ritual signification of choosing the new Pope: “With the Pope retiring, more than 100 cardinals will sequester themselves in the Sistine Chapel to choose the next Pope. They’ll send out white smoke if they’ve chosen somebody, black smoke if they haven’t chosen somebody, and a text message when they find out that it’s 2013.” Underlying this very simple, ableit mildly funny statement, which claims on some level that the papal conclave is an anachronism, is a very common assumption that I think is worth interrogating. It is the assumption that time itself should be a measure of appropriateness or success; that “it’s 2013″, which means that the Catholic Church should “get with the programme”.


This assumption is played out in a number of ways. At its most basic, it assumes that Friday is better simply because it isn’t Thursday, and also that Friday is better than Thursday simply because it is closer to Saturday (Saturday, of course, is better than Friday just because it’s Saturday). Being at university is thus assumed to be better than being at high school simply because it assumes that we are “further along” than we once were (Time, of course, is dealt with in terms of the metaphor of a journey or is often personified as a moving object — “time flies” or “the right time arrives”). But how do you get to University without some kind of preparation? If we keep this way of thinking in tact, we will end up with assuming that Saw 6 must be better than any play by Shakespeare simply because it is newer, or that getting a divorce is better than being married simply because it happened more recently than the wedding, or that being dead is way more progressive than being alive. Degeneration can also happen in the future.

Time itself cannot be a measure of goodness or wisdom or truth or beauty or anything else that is of genuine value. It is simply the framework or container within which we must figure these other more transcendent qualities out. So, yes, we have electronic texts now instead of smoke signals, and the assumption of Fallon’s joke is that this somehow makes the smoke signal ridiculous. But what makes the smoke signal seem ridiculous is not its inherent ridiculousness. It is our way of seeing that is truly ridiculous. We have become slaves to fashion — so obsessed with the new to the point that the question of whether something is really, genuinely better is hardly even asked.  We use the word “outdated” as a derogatory term without understanding that mere speed or difference cannot be proof of something being better. So what if “it’s 2013″ — humanity doesn’t seem to be much better now than at any time before.

Of course, the misuse of the theory of evolution argues that time is the measure of improvement. We are somehow deemed better than monkeys simply because we happened to show up on the timeline a little later on. But I think we are better than monkeys for a host of other reasons that exclude time as a measurement, and worse than monkeys for even more reasons that also exclude the same. And my point is just this: time itself is not enough to improve things. If you leave your lawn unchecked, it will grow wild. If you leave milk out in the sun, it will become sour. The measure of the success of a lawn is its neatness and the measure of milk is its drinkability, not its place in a calendar.

Think of “planned obsolescence”. I have a cellphone contract that I sign that allows (or forces) me to change my phone for a newer one every 2 years. But the only reason I actually need to get the new phone, as far as I can tell, is that if I don’t I will soon be phone-less, because my old phone will soon explode or melt into oblivion. Why will it explode or melt? Because the manufacturers design it to do just that. Why? Because how else will they sell more phones and make more money? My good or wellbeing, or indeed the wellbeing of the culture, is never even considered as part of this imbalanced equation. I serve the machine, and the machine is made of time and money. I can now send a text about the election of the new Pope, but I may still be filled with all kinds of character flaws and corruptions. Just because I’m older doesn’t make me better than my past self.

But, anyway, the point here is that the Catholic Church has decided to set up some rituals that don’t change with the times. Some see this as anachronistic, but it seems to me that this is just good sense. Instead of spending the next five minutes worrying about how to keep up with the times in the following five minutes, the Catholic Church has tried (albeit with some hiccups) to not let something as arbitrary as time be the measure of its success. Some may not necessarily think that this is a good thing, but in order to convince me they will have to do better than quote Bob Dylan’s “The times, they are a-changin’”. My question will still be, what are they changing for? The mere unrolling of time is simply a means towards decay if there is no good reason for it.

Living in a rut

The following was originally published on January 11, 2013.

I recently finished watching Roy Anderson’s astonishing film Songs from the second floor (2000). Anderson is clearly a philosopher, and has a keen eye for marrying absurdity to beauty. His characters, so completely enveloped in their own misery and lostness, simply fail to see the humour in what they are experiencing. There is a nihilistic edge in Anderson’s vision, but it is not entirely devoid of purpose. It therefore stands in stark contrast with two other films that I watched recently, the Coen brothers’ highly enjoyable meditation on the pointlessness of events in A serious man (2009) and David Lynch’s aimless Inland empire (2006).

While the Coens rob their characters of the possibility of finding any meaning outside of their own attempts to understand the world and while Lynch holds fast non-meaning and the non-logic of dreams in a bizarre conglomeration of non-sequiturs, Anderson presents a world that clearly makes sense, but with characters who fail to see any sense in it. His characters tend to reach conclusions about their own situations that are far from accurate. This reflects their own spiritual wasteland, but does not necessarily assume the complete absence of the transcendent. Most of the central characters, shown through a series of almost-but-not-quite connected vignettes, are often found repeating the same idea in different settings. An old man constantly complains that his business has “gone up in smoke” (He literally set fire to it) and that his son “went nuts” because he wrote too much poetry (It is clear that this is not the reason that he went mad). His other son keeps on reciting a line of poetry — “Beloved be the ones who sit down” — even though he is not quite certain of its significance. And a nurse keeps on asking the doctor she is having an affair with with when he is going to divorce his wife (His silence reveals that he has no such intention, but this does not stop the nurse from pestering him).


These repeated lines and scenarios are like many of the stories we tell ourselves to convince us that we understand the world. But, as theory on narrative fallacy goes, understanding the story about something is not the same as understanding the thing itself. Nevertheless, we keep repeating our stories, keep telling ourselves that this-is-how-it-works even when the truth might be utterly different. We hear people say, for example, that ‘Everything happens for a reason’ and even find repeated stories about the meaning of life in the way that people spend money on more stuff: shoes, better technology, bigger houses, smarter cars, et cetera, et cetera.

Another interesting symbol in Anderson’s movie is the presence of ghosts who seem to interact somewhat with the living. As is typical in folklore about ghosts, they exist in a loop, constantly repeating themselves even though such repetitions make no difference to any outcome. And, of course, this is precisely the point that Anderson is getting at. The people in his story are all ghosts. And perhaps we are potentially ghosts too. We all have a tendency to do what we have been doing for no other reason than that that’s what we have always been doing. This is the ontological structure of a rut.

One of my favourite scenes from the film shows a massive open floor at an airport as a very large crowd of people begins to fill the floor on their way to check in for their flights. But they are all carrying baggage that is very, very heavy — so heavy, in fact, that they can barely move it. The check-in counter seems miles away; perhaps it is unreachable. We don’t get to see what happens to the people when they reach the check-in counter, but I would guess the following possibility. In keeping with the absurdism of the film, let’s imagine that the people are allowed to check-in all that baggage. Even so, it’ll soon become obvious, in a strange dance between tragedy and comedy, that the plane is so overloaded that it is unable to get off the ground. In this imagined ending to this scene, the people are carrying too much stuff and stuck in too many ruts, and as a consequence the heavens have become totally unreachable. This is not to say that these folks will never get into the the kingdom of the sky at all, but it is saying something about the fact that it’s difficult to fly when we do not take ourselves lightly. Maybe it’s impossible to fly when you’re on autopilot.

Liminal Capital: Exhibition Opening

What follows is a rough approximation of a speech that I gave on 28 September 2014 to open an art exhibition — entitled ‘Liminal Capital’ — at the Tina Skukan Gallery in Pretoria. My friends Magdel van Rooyen and Maricke du Plessis have done an amazing job of curating the exhibition, and it was really lovely to be able to offer a short, highly incomplete reflection on the city I grew up in.

…


There’s an old joke from the communist era about a man who was sent from East Germany to work in Siberia. He knew that censors would read his mail, so he told his friends: “Let’s create a code. If a letter you get from me is written in blue ink, then what I’m saying is true. If it’s written in red ink, you can be sure that what I’m saying is false.” A short while later, the first letter from the man arrived and everything was written in blue. It read: “Everything is really wonderful here. There are movie theatres and playgrounds, and the apartments here are the epitome of luxury. The stores are full of good food. The only thing you cannot buy is red ink.”


I know that we’re not living in a communist era, even if many of our politicians have communist aspirations, but I love the ambiguity at the end of the joke because it reminds us that often our relationship with places and spaces is just that: ambiguous. But then there is an alternative view, as there always is. Robert Louis Stevenson has pointed out that “[s]ome places speak distinctly. Certain dank gardens cry aloud for a murder; certain old houses demand to be haunted; certain coasts are set apart for shipwrecks”.


So what is this place, Pretoria, saying to us? Is the message ambiguous or distinct? Is there a message at all?


Whenever I think of the idea of a city, I think of China Miéville’s novel The City and The City, which takes place in two cities that occupy exactly the same geographical space. And yet the two cities are perceived by the various denizens to be different places. Every resident must dutifully unsee the other city. This is to say that they must actively fail to acknowledge the existence of the other city. As a consequence, they learn to recognize things as belonging to the other city without actually seeing them. They acknowledge the unacknowledgeable and unacknowledge the acknowledgeable. If an individual ignores the imperative to unsee the other city, he or she is deemed guilty of a terrible crime calledbreaching — a crime that is considered worse than murder in Miéville’s tale.


Maybe this can be taken, at least partly, as a metaphor or parable about our own relationship with Pretoria. Are there spaces in Pretoria that we see, and are there spaces that we unsee?


The answer must, I think, be yes.


Clearly, a borderland between the two cities is real. There are two cities, or perhaps more than two cities. Each city within this one city is delineated by borders, thresholds, boundaries. I guess places are always understood in terms of liminality. There is a betweenness that we are always negotiating, fumbling towards, stumbling into. And this means that the simple idea of inhabiting a space or dwelling in a place is always far more complex than what we usually recognize.


When I think of Pretoria, I think of it as the place I grew up in, but I also think of it as the place I now live. There are two cities, both cities in constant flux: one in the past and one in the present. But the place I grew up in and the place I now live are two different places. Many thresholds have been crossed. Many new boundaries have been constructed and have fallen away, leaving me to question where the one city ends and the other begins.


Perhaps I can illustrate this sense of a constant becoming by referring to my experience of one place within this place. When I was a kid, my parents would often take my siblings and me to the Hatfield Bakery in Duncan Street to buy bread. It was the best bread in Pretoria — it tasted like cake. Of course, as an added bonus, the bakery also made actual cake. And what made this food even better was the fact that we as a family knew the Andrews family that owned and ran the bakery.

Back then Pretoria felt to me very much like a small town. The Duncan Street that the Hatfield Bakery was in was a narrow road with only two lanes, one going in either direction. But things changed, as they always do.

The boundaries shifted.


I’m not exactly sure of the order in which they changed, but a few things happened. At one point, the Hatfield Bakery, which I think had been in the same old building for over fifty or sixty years, had to move to another building, one right next door to the old building. At another point, at least as I have the story, a certain businessman discovered that the name of the Hatfield Bakery hadn’t been trademarked because such legalities weren’t necessary when the bakery had opened all those years ago. So he — whoever he was — decided to steal the name and the visual identity of the bakery for his own gain and trademark it for a bakery that he then opened in what was then the new Hatfield Mall.


This meant that the Andrews family were forced to change the name of their bakery — and this, despite the fact that the name was so intimately connected with their own family heritage. Then, things changed once more, and the newly named Five Loaves Bakery had to move again, this time across the road to what has got to be one of the ugliest buildings in the Hatfield Area, or possibly Pretoria.


Later, for various reasons, the bakery finally closed down. And even later, Duncan Street was expanded; and, finally, just a year or so ago, it too had its name changed to something else. The street that carried my name became something else. A friend of mine said that when you get a new house, you want to be able to put your own furniture into it and hang up your own curtains. Is that what all the renaming has been about — hanging up new curtains?


Now, in this present-day Pretoria, I don’t go to a bakery run by family friends. Instead, I go to one or more chain stores where bread is baked in a factory, packaged in plastic bags by people I have never met and distributed without any semblance of personality.


It’s hard not to let nostalgia take over, right?


I often think of my memories of Pretoria as more authentic. Sometimes the quaint Pretoria that I knew as a child feels more personal than the sprawling monster of traffic jams and road works and horrific malls that it seems to have become. There was a city and there is a city. And the message of this city remains both clear and ambiguous.


But I have recently come to understand something about this liminal capital — this ever-shifting, ever-evolving beast of a city. The liminality is not just about the place, but has always been primarily about my own subjective experience of the place. Pretoria has changed but I have changed too. Boundaries and borders have shifted inside me. Because that’s what happens in life. We all have to cross thresholds, every day.


Sometimes you just have to walk through a door.


And brings me to a second message of the parable located in China Miéville’s story. A place can only ever be properly understood from the inside. From the outside, it’s just a thing. But from the inside, understood from this internalized space within the self, it’s more like a human being — something complex and loaded with personality. There is a paradox here, of course: Pretoria is not located in Pretoria, but in an intermediation between people who live and breathe together in a shared environment defined and redefined by ever-shifting boundaries. Pretoria is located, I think, in a dialogue. It is located in the between, just as we are.


What we have here at this exhibition is an expression of this simple fact.


We have a selection of works by artists who have offered personal views of their own unique perspectives on the city. There are images of pigeons — an ocean of bubbling feathers indicating a city always in flux, set against a backdrop of seemingly immovable buildings. There are crumpled maps — signs of an era before GPSs and also of an era before various names were changed. There are images taken from fragments: a statue of our most recognizable national icon combined with images of actual places in this city. There are bridges and there are yellow beacons, sculptures and other images and abstractions too, all reminding us of the fact that we live in a city that we cannot and must not unsee. 


We Pretorians should all find ourselves guilty of the crime of breaching that Miéville tells us about in his novel.We must acknowledge that there are different perspectives on Pretoria. It is one place but it is also more than one space. It is singular, but it is also multiple.


There is a message and the message is clear. There is a city. But I hope you will also get a sense from these images of the genuine ambiguity that we find ourselves forced to confront. There is a city. It’s a wonderful place, but it’s sometimes difficult to find the right ink — difficult to find just the right way to draw lines, offer words and create images. Although, having said that, the artists who have contributed to this exhibition seem to have done pretty well nonetheless.

Changing your mind: An impossibility?

What makes it so very difficult for people to change their minds (even when a truth that has been presented to them is overwhelmingly against their present convictions)?

Last year, after several weeks of teaching the work of Marshall McLuhan, I found myself somewhat disheartened by the answers that my students had given in their tests. At least half of them had managed to totally misunderstand McLuhan’s central thesis — The medium is the message — despite the fact that I had spent at least ten minutes at the beginning of every lecture reiterating its significance before moving on to further implications of the idea.


“It is not,” I would say, adopting an air of seriousness, “the content that is the main issue here, but the container.” Or, I would put it differently: “The TV may as well have cathode-ray snow on it rather than the news or pornography or anything else. It is the television itself that brings about the greatest change when it comes to how we relate to the world and each other.” Or, otherwise, “It is the medium that introduces a new scale into our interactions, not the content of that medium”.

And so on, etc, etc.

I would follow this simple (albeit novel) idea, expressed in various different ways, with countless examples of how this idea is true — how it plays out — and then provide the students with oodles of reading to help them to drill that simple idea into their heads. But then, in their test answers, more than half the class ended up saying something like this: “When McLuhan says that the medium is the message, he means that what matters most is what the medium says (the content), not how it says it (the medium itself).” That, in case you missed it, is the exact opposite of what I was trying to teach them.


I hope you will now understand me when you see me in my office throwing my hands up in exasperation. “Seriously?” I think “That’s what you thought I was saying!?” Despite hours in class and even more hours studying, many of my beloved students will tend to simply revert back to the belief they had before they began the course. Yes, I see, there is a kind of horrible truth here in that this very situation proves McLuhan to be right again: the content of a course is less important than the environment that convinces the students that they’re being educated (even when they’re not learning anything).


In any case, I recall this in the light of the fact that I was watching a debate recently where it became patently clear that the primary protagonist of the debate, who also happened to be the primary antagonist in the debate, was absolutely right about something — his arguments were well reasoned and well informed — and yet was being met with tremendous resistance and criticism from those whom he was criticising. The people resisting him never once dealt with him at the level of his argument, but resorted instead to using a whole range of creative ad hominems.

So I ask again: What makes it so very difficult for people to change their minds?
There are many reasons, of course, but I want to offer just one:
Pressure.

At the risk of providing yet another oversimplification, people operate, whether consciously or un/non-consciously in accordance with the pressure, whether perceived or real, that is exerted on them. Dubner and Levitt’s contention in Freakonomics, Super Freakonomics, and Think like a Freak that human beings work according to incentives — positive or negative; carrot or stick — gets at the same idea. The pressure may be the pressure to be happy or the pressure to get money or to keep a job. But I think that the two primary sources of pressure are pride (which consists of maintaining a picture that we have of ourselves as being somewhat better than we really are) or acceptance (by some Other — Heidegger’s The They, or Lacan’s big Other, etc.). Acceptance, though, always comes back to pride: who we want to be.

So pride is the main problem: the culprit is us.

We want to see ourselves positively; to have a sense of our own self-importance; to preserve our sense of identity.


Perhaps this is why people of various religions are so keen on the idea of hell: psychologically speaking, it puts the ego at a huge advantage and the pressure to stick to what you do believe as the absolutely right thing to believe is increased a hundredfold. Being wrong, at least according to these hellbent ideologies, has very severe consequences indeed. Anyway, isn’t a fundamentalist really just someone who feels the pressure to conform more severely than those who are less rigidly dogmatic? Maybe fundamentalism is just egotism disguised in the language of faith.


The fact that pride is the main problem means that we want to see ourselves as being right — changing our minds, then, would run counter to this incentive/pressure, because it would imply that we have been wrong and therefore less than perfect, and therefore less than worthy of our sense of self-importance. Studies have shown that narcissists are especially confident when it comes to believing the truth of their own assertions, no matter how obviously wrong they might be. And, it turns out, as studies especially in the field of self-deception have shown, that the best way to reinforce your own biases is through the derogation of others, hence the reason why people resort so quickly to the ad hominem. If you want to make sure you’re right, you have to invent an enemy for yourself (Girard’s mimetic realism has a lot to say about this process).


It’s the logic of hellfire again, and scapegoating, and victimisation: “We’re in, they’re out. Hooray for us!”


The solution to the problem of pride is, of course, humility/modesty — at least, some kind of epistemic humility that accepts that what we know and believe may not be absolute or ultimate. I wouldn’t take this to an extreme, though, since this would create a kind of perpetual mental paralysis, where nothing can be known except that nothing can be known, as Chesterton notes in Orthodoxy:



“Modesty has moved from the organ of ambition. Modesty has settled upon the organ of conviction where it was never meant to be. A man was meant to be doubtful about himself, but undoubting about the truth: this has been exactly reversed. Nowadays the part of a man that a man does assert is exactly the part he ought not to assert-himself. The part he doubts is exactly the part he ought not to doubt — the Divine Reason… The old humility was a spur that prevented a man from stopping: not a nail in his boot that prevented him from going on. For the old humility made a man doubtful about his efforts, which might make him work harder. But the new humility makes a man doubtful about his aims, which will make him stop working altogether.”

Who are the students that learn the best — that grow and change to the point of being willing to have their own minds changed? The answer is simple: Those who are confident in their ability to learn (confident, that is, in the organ of conviction that is the mind), but humble about what they have learned; those who know that they can expand their knowledge, but also that they will not ever know everything. People often wonder about the intelligent versus the unintelligent, and in my work I’ve wondered the same. I suppose we have tests of all kinds to measure the difference. But, to me, it has become absolutely clear that those who learn the most are also those who assume that they have not yet arrived — that they may not ever arrive — but who are certain that the pursuit of knowledge is worthy of their time and energy.

What makes it so very difficult for people to change their minds?


Simple: they are not humble enough.


They still believe a lie; that the content or message (the self) is deemed more important than the container or the medium (reality).


…


Some books that shaped my thinking on this stuff:

Dubner, S & Levitt, S. 2014. Think like a freak. London: Penguin.
Hallinan, Joseph. 2014. Kidding ourselves. New York: Crown.
Ten Elshof, Gregg A. 2009. I told me so. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
Trivers, R. 2013. Deceit and self-deception. London: Penguin.

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