Sunday, January 3, 2016

The most disturbing day of the year

The following was originally published on Christmas day, 2014.

I’m not exactly sure how Christmas-time turned into what it has. A few weeks ago, when I found myself emerging from the London Tube at Regent Street to an explosion of neon lights and Boney M’s godawful rendition of Hark the herald, it struck me that this commercialist-kitsch fanfare is almost certainly the antithesis of what Christmas originally represented. Odd, I thought, how England, which has largely abandoned its religious traditions, seems more religious about Christmas than the land of my birth, which still has a fairly definite sense of its roots in Christianity.


Anyhow, the story, through familiarity and custom, has nonetheless become somewhat mild, but it once contained an idea that is no doubt beautiful, but also, no doubt, alarming. The idea is that the Ground of Being, the Logos (Λόγος) as the glue of reality, took on flesh and blood and moved into a very human neighbourhood, as a very actual (not just mythical) human being. Today, God is often thought of as an object — a bearded old man like Zeus — but he was once thought of as ‘Something’ quite different. God — the very“inexpressible Good, this One, this Source of all unity, this supra-existent Being. Mind beyond mind, word beyond speech” which is “gathered by no discourse, by no intuition, by no name” and “is as no other being is” (“Cause of all existence, and therefore … transcending existence”), as Pseudo-Dionysius describes him — violated his own commandment not to make a graven image and stepped into skin like a walking blasphemy.


There in a cave, a baby boy — pissing, shitting, crying, sleeping — was (mis)taken by shepherds and philosophers for being the Originator of the Universe. Their claim, which most Christians still hold today, was that the One who is so unlike what is conceivable that he is more like nothing than like anything else and yet is not nothing — some Jewish Rabbinic traditions refer to God as the No-Thing — took on a name and a culture and became, of all things, finite and mortal; the Source of Life took on a form that is always in the process of dying. Life took on death, or so it is claimed.


To look at this from another angle, it’s helpful to read Chesterton’s reflection on Christmas in his The Everlasting Man (1925):



Christ was not only born on the level of the world, but even lower than the world. The first act of the divine drama was enacted, not only on no stage set up above the sightseer, but on a dark and curtained stage sunken out of sight; and that is an idea very difficult to express in most modes of artistic expression. It is the idea of simultaneous happenings on different levels of life. Something like it might have been attempted in the more archaic and decorative medieval art. But the more the artists learned of realism and perspective, the less they could depict at once the angels in the heavens and the shepherds on the hills, and the glory in the darkness that was under the hills. Perhaps it could have been best conveyed by the characteristic expedient of some of the medieval guilds, when they wheeled about the streets a theatre with three stages one above the other, with heaven above the earth and hell under the earth. But in the riddle of Bethlehem it was heaven that was under the earth.

The idea is one of a revolution, of a world turned upside-down; of the most powerful becoming the most humble; of rich people stepping down to help the poor; of people who conform to the norm stepping out to welcome the outcasts. That which was before all things and atemporal stepped into a drama long ago established and destined to end, perhaps in blood (although there would also be cries of resurrection — or, as Peter Rollins suggests — insurrection: the Uprising of Christ). The Jesus-movement would shape history so profoundly that even the largely atheistic fall victim to his ethic. Whenever a victim is defended, or wherever the environment is cared for, we’re not looking at some evolutionary development, because (as Dawkins notes) evolution (encased in our genetic makeup) neither knows nor cares. Rather, we are looking at the morality of Jesus: something definite that upturned the complacency of those in charge and forced humanity to rethink its love of power.

So, yes, whatever you believe about this event — and it is an event in the catastrophic philosophic sense, meaning that which happens in such a way as to entirely disrupt our perspective — it does not take much to see that it is not about a God who is tame and cute. Rather, it is an event that calls people to see the baby Jesus as we see the presence of any new child (but with a twist): it is something terrifying; it is something to be marvelled at; it is something earth and life-shattering. This is something that parenthood has taught me. Images of cute smiling infants carry only half the truth: the other half is the bit that we miss about Christmas, namely the mindblowing, bewildering awe of the event.


That Jesus was born to a very poor family in first century Palestine is something easily forgotten amidst all the glitz of Christmas lights and the torment of endless shopping lists. If Christ had been born in America today, the event wouldn’t have been called the incarnation, but rather (maybe, if theologians had a sense of humour) the intarnation: God taking on the life of a hillbilly.


It’s not an easy one to get a handle on. And, really, I’m not sure it was ever meant to be an idea that we could get a handle on. The first Christians proclaimed the idea, not because they thought it would make a nice story, but because they (most disturbingly of all) believed it was actually true. This is certainly the most alarming thing. It seems so naive. And yet, the happening was so cataclysmic that it split time into two and forced generations to rethink the nature of God and Reality. It was an event that meant that maybe God is not so distant after all. Maybe Reality is actually personal. Maybe the divine is something we can find in a cave, in a place of very local limitations, where the hands that flung stars into space could not even reach the heads of animals around him.


May you have a very disturbing Christmas.

Charlie Hebdo and Fundamentalism

The following was originally published on my old site on January 8, 2015.

When something truly terrible happens, the temptation is always to act on impulse. But the impulse that arises from a tragedy is usually not a good one. It is often hateful and fearful, and I think that the world could do without these things. A few years ago, America’s ‘War on Terror’ was precisely the result of acting too quickly in hatred and fear. It was all John Wayne, bombs, guns and even more tragedy. Turns out fighting fire with fire simply makes more fire. So, sometimes we need to override impulse and try to see the tragedy in the light of a new day.


The attacks in Paris yesterday, by Islamists on satirists, exposes the reality of fundamentalism in its purest (and therefore most frightening form). Some have suggested that those guns were targeting free speech, which I suppose is partially correct, but to suggest that this is the main issue at hand is to suggest that fundamentalism is primarily an issue of one ideology versus others. And it really isn’t. It’s not even an issue of religious exclusivity versus liberal inclusivity; nor is it an issue of religion versus irreligion for, after all, atheistic fundamentalism follows the same structure as religious fundamentalisms.


The primary issue is a conflict between the literal (the systematic) and the symbolic (the parabolic or dramatic), which is really a conflict between certainty and real faith. The fundamentalist doesn’t need faith, because he knows. This is why Slavoj Žižek writes in God in pain that “in the opposition between traditional secular humanists and religious fundamentalists, it is the humanists who stand for belief, while the fundamentalists stand for knowledge — in short, the true danger of fundamentalism does not reside in the fact that it poses a threat to secular scientific knowledge, but in the fact that it poses a threat to authentic belief itself”.


With this in mind, fundamentalism is easily defined as a rabid refusal to understand what it means to dwell in language. Fundamentalism is, to use Lacanian terms, foreclosed from the symbolic.

Religion — that is, true religion or authentic belief —  originates in the symbolic. The religious idea springs from something like an observation of a thing that is beautiful or awe-inspiring, like the sun, and then hopes that it — the sun in this case — has a meaning that is beyond its literal self. That meaning, the pagan might think, could be the sun god. “Very often,” GK Chesterton writes, in an early draft in his The Everlasting Man (1925), “one fancies, the god exists first and is given the sun for a crown. Anyhow, [the pagan] does not so much clothe the sun with godhead as clothe his god with the sun.” The idea is that the personality of the god perfects the sun with significance, not the other way around.

Of course, the three monotheistic religions — Judaism, Christianity and Islam — of our day do not speak of gods, but of God: a singular source of all that is diverse. (I wish creationists would realise this instead of wasting their time arguing for what is in effect still just another demiurgic small-g god; creationism is atheism, but that’s another issue).


Anyway, even the revelation of that capital-G God began, historically speaking, precisely in the profound awareness of the limits of material reality and also in the limits of language when confronted even with that reality. Something in us hunkers after something more than us. This is not something we can help. Even the most committed atheist is still out there figuring out how it all fits together and what it all means, which is why Nietzsche connected the very grammar of language to the fact that we can’t seem to rid ourselves of God. God persists.


Nevertheless, if you follow the history of philosophy and religion, as Karen Armstrong for one has done in her book The Battle for God, you discover some very interesting twists and turns that have resulted, gradually, in the disintegration of the symbolic order, and the dis-integration of belief. Gradually, humanity moved away from the transcendent. The transcendent had, people thought, served its purpose, which was to spur us on to what Coldplay calls ‘questions of science, science and progress.’


The irony of this is that the world has become, not simpler, but far more complex. Our obsession with the literal and empirical has not brought greater clarity, but greater conflict and confusion. And the opinions around us breed like flies, proliferating in all directions, causing further rigidity and therefore also further conflict. Without the ability to think symbolically, we find it harder to navigate the world, not easier. Why? Because the symbolic allows for mystery and uncertainty, which (if you haven’t noticed) is what most of our human experience is comprised of. It allows one to “fit one’s head into the heavens” as Chesterton says, instead of trying to fit the heavens into one’s head, which will only cause one’s head to explode.


The result of this failure to access the symbolic is that people want more and more certainty. And so they pick sides, and doctrines — whether from their holy books or from Darwin — and find reasons why their side is right and why everyone else is wrong. And everything in the world is then painted in black and white, with neat in or out categories, even though we know that this just makes us look colourblind. From a psychoanalytic perspective, though, this failure to access the symbolic is the essential characteristic of psychosis: the inability to move from the signifier to the signified. It is, diagnostically speaking, insane.


And, if you’ll forgive the simplification, the only proper response to insanity is sanity. And so it seems appropriate to me that so many of the responses to the attack on Charlie Hebdo have been from cartoonists (like Ruben Oppenheimer, whose image I’ve included here), who are permanently living in the world of the symbolic. Their world, unlike the world of fundamentalists, allows for ambiguities and humour; and it is precisely the kind of world that we live in. It’s precisely the kind of world that religions have traditionally been so good at navigating, but which, under the spell of scientistic literalism, have started to falter.


It turns out that the symbolic is actually part of the very same mechanism that allows us to empathise with different perspectives (Mirror neurons have been connected to our ability to understand metaphors, as James Geary writes in I is an Other). If you, for instance, take a metaphor like Shakespeare’s famous “Juliet is the sun”, you are more profoundly confronted with Romeo’s perceptions of Juliet than if he had said “Juliet is about 5-foot-eight and has auburn hair”. The symbolic opens us up to another person’s perspective far more than the literal, and often in fewer words. The literal is a trap. It is a cage. And, yes, I’m speaking metaphorically.


Still, my basic argument, which is very poorly outlined above, is that we actually need more of the symbolic. We need more good stories and images. We need the stations of the cross more than we need the doctrines of St. Paul. We need parables more than systematic theology; more Catholicism and less Protestantism. We need, if you will, more fiction and fewer facts. Because facts, when torn away from the symbolic, are inevitably just violent.

The virtue of hypocrisy

There’s a joke about a guy — let’s call him Bill — who visits his local bar and, without fail, orders four pints of beer every night. He drinks in silence, pays, then leaves. One night he sits down and orders three pints of beer instead of four and the barman is curious.
“I have to ask,” says the barman, “why are you ordering only three pints when you usually order four?”
“Well,” says Bill, “I’ve always ordered four pints because one is for me and the other three are for my father and my two brothers. And, well, the sad truth is that my father passed away recently, so now I just drink for myself and my brothers.”
This answer satisfies the barman, and for months Bill’s ritual continues, only now with three pints instead of four. A while later, though, Bill walks into the bar, sits down, and orders two pints. The barman is saddened by this sight for obvious reasons.
“I’m very sorry. Did something happen to one of your brothers?” he asks Bill.
“Oh dear, no,” says Bill, laughing. “You don’t need to worry at all. My brothers are fine. I’ve just stopped drinking for me because I’ve just learned that I’m an alcoholic.”

And that is hypocrisy.


It’s probably the number one criticism levelled against the religiously inclined: they — who is this “they” anyway? — are hypocrites. It sounds like the worst possible thing you could say to anyone but I’m wondering if it’s not always as bad as it sounds. Surely it’s better to be accused of failing to do the right thing than to be accused of not even having a ‘right thing’ to be measured up against at all? It’s certainly better, in my view, to miss the mark than to have no idea of whether or not there is a mark to begin with. The virtue of hypocrisy is that it points so clearly towards the virtues that seem to be absent from speech and action.


Although I don’t like to preface what I say with disclaimers, I feel that it’s important to point out that what follows is, as usual, just a brief thought experiment, and should therefore be taken as such. I’m not planning to prove that black is white or that white is green, but I do want to suggest that maybe there’s more going on in accusations of hypocrisy than some may like to admit.


A simple idea guides the following, namely that there is a subtle benefit to the accusation of hypocrisy in that it always puts the accuser on the side of the virtues that the hypocrite claims to believe in.


When, for instance, the atheist accuses the Islamo-fascist of hypocrisy in their killing of the innocent (a fair accusation, as recent events have shown), she is automatically siding, among other things, with the Quran’s injunction to prioritise the inner struggle (which is what jihad really means) to submit to a kind and merciful God over any kind of vindictive conflict. Even if the atheist critic thinks that the violence committed by the Islamo-fascist is inherent in Islam, she will soon be confronted with the falsity of her beliefs (especially if she bothers to actually read the Quran properly).

It is not widely known by non-Muslims, but it’s worth pointing out that the Quran condemns aggression in the strongest terms (2:190), is clear that hostility towards others is deeply misguided, stresses that retaliation is only allowed in the form of defence and never in the form of outright attack (2:192-193), and is adamant that coercion in matters of belief is absolutely forbidden by God (2:256). Peace always remains the priority in the holy book of the Muslims. War is always a last resort and should stop when the ‘enemy’ ceases to attack.


And so, really, the Muslim hypocrite is being accused not for being a Muslim but for not being enough of a Muslim. And in the process the atheistic critic is unconsciously assuming allegiance with Islam over any allegiance with the Muslim’s hypocrisy. With atheism, of course, this kind of reversal of beliefs by means of actions is common, since it is by definition a belief without content; it is, in essence, discontent. So whereas the Islamist stands for a kind of atheism (as a rejection of all moral grounding), the atheist stands for Islam (the submission to a definite moral order and moral law-giver). The atheist becomes, therefore, a kind of virtuous hypocrite: a critic who acts and speaks like a Muslim, and on behalf of true Islam.


But what about those who do hold to a particular religion and who have stepped out to criticise those who have not adopted their own religion? Take, for instance, the Christian who judges the Muslim for his particular religious affiliation. Well, the Christian critic of Islam, by asserting his allegiance with Christianity and with the Christ of Christianity, puts his belief above his own words and actions, and thereby emphasises the truth of his beliefs albeit through a kind of warped via negativa.


He judges what he does not yet understand, and has not even bothered to question (contra Matthew 7:1-3); he treats his so-called enemy in a way that he himself would not want to be treated (contra Matthew 5:44 and 7:12); and, ultimately, he actually prizes his own identity over that of others, which is something strongly discouraged in the New Testament (contra Philippians 2:3, Matthew 16:25 and Galatians 3:28). This may seem like a simplification, but the general idea is that in criticising the other too quickly, the Christian critic who has conflated Islam with Islamism is automatically siding with a kind of egotism that is simply not Christian. He thereby only proves that he is wrong and that the object of his faith is right. He shows that not only is the Muslim not Muslim enough, but also that he is not Christian enough.


I could go on like this all day, proving by playing with words that atheists can be Muslims and that Christians can be anti-Christian, but by now the point I’m trying to make should be clear enough. The virtue of hypocrisy is that it argues, if only implicitly, that our actions and speech acts actually do matter; that they are often really the most potent summary of what we do actually believe, whether consciously or not. However, I would not absolutise action too much, owing that this is a tendency in postmodernism that I find unhelpful. I’m not saying that our actions are the sum total of what we believe. What they do, though, is tell us that maybe we have a way to go; that we should, perhaps, look at the enemy within us instead of just looking for the enemy out there in straw men and 2D cardboard cutouts of our own invention. Hypocrisy tells us that the truth is out there, in our speech and in our actions; it also tells us the truth about the lies we tell ourselves, which is that there are things we know that we don’t even want ourselves to know.

Dear Stephen Fry

You probably won’t care to know this, Stephen, but your little rant about God didn’t exactly solve the whole God-debate for me (I don’t think that’s what you intended anyway). I actually found it rather funny that a man could summon so much aggression against a character that he regards as fictional. Imagine someone getting really, really angry at Frodo for being short.

Anyway, even if the God you were talking about did exist, your outrage didn’t manage to convince me, once and for all, that atheists of the more dogmatic kind are the most trustworthy source when it comes to assessing the finer points of what is real, true and plausible. I still have too many questions, and I have no doubt that I will have a few more even once/if those questions are answered. And, anyhow, it seems to me that there are few important things that you may have overlooked, like, say, three thousand years of mysticism, philosophy and metaphysical speculation. Still, to give credit where it is due, you’ve raised some very interesting and valuable points while also conjuring up some very serious doubts in my own mind about the validity of your brief argument.


For instance, while I agree absolutely with you that there’s a lot of really awful stuff going on that’s ‘not our fault’ and while there seems to be no shortage of what is ‘utterly, utterly evil’, this isn’t enough to convince me that it would be some God’s fault. Actually, to confuse even a God you don’t believe in with everything else that happens seems to me to be a fairly obvious category error. It’s like confusing a manufacturer of a car with an accident that happened in that car last Tuesday because someone lost concentration while driving. Yes, the car was involved, but it was not the manufacturer’s doing, was it? Even with the limitations of this analogy in mind, I’m not convinced that the alternative — namely that it’s all just blind, indifferent chance — is a much better option, because in that scenario not only does suffering occur, but it, like everything else, also has no grounded meaning despite the fact that we insist on it meaning something.


To make the issue much more confusing, though, there also happens to be a rather ridiculous amount of stuff around here that is quite astonishingly good (which is something you only hint at in your rant). There’s tea, the Medusa Nebula, the books of Douglas Adams, and Mozart’s Clarinet Concerto, for starters, not to mention about a centillion other things. Actually, there is, quite overwhelmingly, more good in the universe than bad, or at least more that is remarkable than merely detestable. But a negativity bias makes this easy to overlook, I guess.


You began your rant about what you’d say to God if you discovered that he or she is really there, with ‘I’d say bone cancer in children? What’s that about? How dare you?’ And I couldn’t help but want to draw your attention to a more fundamental point: ‘Children? What are they about? How dare you?’ I’m being facetious, but the trouble with your outburst was that it put the very small cart of things that go wrong before the very large horse of all the things that actually go right in the world. Like, for example, the fact that any of us can string a sentence together or the fact that most of us have legs and opinions.


I’m not dismissing the horrible stuff in the universe. I agree with you that it’s all a problem of unfathomable proportions. But the good stuff is a problem too, or at least a gigantic question. My point is that I think that levelling complaints even at a God you don’t believe in should include complaints about the fact that there is existence as such. Because without it, there’d be quite literally nothing to worry about.


It seems to me, in my naivety perhaps, that existence itself is in itself rather good even in spite of the misery that we go through. Even after going through some very terrible things myself, I cannot help but marvel at the sheer, bewildering thereness of it all. The universe is, when we really pay attention to it with the eyes of a child rather than the cynicism of an old man, a surplus of astonishment. Even the fact that the central nervous system picks up pain, for example, is itself nothing other than remarkable, and, yes, even good (as researchers studying leprosy, that disease that takes away a person’s ability to feel pain, will tell you). The fact that the nervous system knows that something is wrong is rooted in the reality that something is very, very right. Something is working. That is why we know when things go wrong.


And then there’s our ability to recognize the trauma and tragedy of having a child with bone cancer. The reason it grieves us so is because we are absolutely, unequivocally convinced of the profound value of that child’s life. This value, in case you missed it, is not an evolutionary concept. It’s not something that blind chance accounts for; well, not unless you take evolution in teleological terms, which would be tantamount to accepting that there is a God out there after all. And have you ever noticed just how profound the compassion that we see in the face of suffering is? Ghandi, Mother Theresa, etc. Selflessness of that sort is an absolute violation of evolutionary imperatives, and yet there it is. It doesn’t explain the suffering or explain it away, but it acknowledges that there is still goodness in the world that’s worth paying attention to.

Which brings me to what perplexes me most about your tirade. It was rooted in a very deep sense of what is moral, too. And whether you like it or not, such morality seems to be alarmingly dependent upon a particular understanding of the good that was handed to you, in this case, largely by the Christian tradition that still flows through the veins of Great Britain despite its largely atheistic contemporary culture. In fact, it’s the very morality against which you measure the Greek gods, who at least weren’t pretending to be any good at all. Would you genuinely prefer morally inconsistent gods like those of the Greeks? No problem! Just remember that if your universe were built on such moral inconsistencies, your very own tirade would have been logically impossible. We have to have an idea of what is good before we can go on at length about what isn’t.


And then, there was the bit about calling the God you don’t believe in stupid. Well, actually, that bit makes me laugh. Because there, right there, is another absolute in your rhetorical arsenal called intelligence, as if in this atheistic, indifferent universe it actually matters. I know, however, that you’re probably directing that comment against people who are stupid enough to believe in God. But, well, belief is not about intelligence. God is not something you can know in the same way that you can know what took place on QI or know what the capital of Paraguay is. It’s not a knowable thing, which is precisely why God is the subject of faith and not knowledge. And so you will also find very intelligent people who believe in God and very stupid people who don’t, and vice versa.


So, well, there you have it. You have raised questions about suffering, which is fair because we all have those questions, but you also inadvertently used a predominantly religious grounding on which to raise all those questions. And that’s not playing fair. As Nietzsche said about George Eliot and her ilk: ‘They are rid of the Christian God and now believe all the more firmly that they must cling to Christian morality’. I find Nietzsche’s insane atheism more honest simply because he was consistent in his rejection of God.


But, really, I’m not trying to prove anything here, Stephen. I’m not trying to say, Look, there’s morality so there must be a Moral Law Maker, a.k.a God. I’m not even saying, Look at all that’s good in the world; there must be a Source of all goodness, or Look at how we unavoidably find or make meaning even in the face of the incomprensible so there must be something meant by Someone about all of this. God is not disprovable by what you hate or provable by what I like. What I am saying is that things like morality and goodness and meaning are questions that you cannot simply accept without bothering to notice the degree to which you are still relying on religious language, even in a world of radical contingencies.


But, anyway, I still want to thank you for giving me a few things to think about. I cannot provide any resolution to the matter, though, because I don’t think there is one. People have had questions about God and suffering since time immemorial. And I, for one, would like to use those questions to push me to think a little more. Because the only thought that should be stopped is the thought that stops us thinking. I’m glad this is something you seem to agree with. It’s always good to get the conversation going.


Yours sincerely,
Duncan Reyburn


(Originally published on February 8, 2015)

Love is this

On the surface and from the outside, Valentine’s Day looks like the ultimate symbol of our cultural somnambulism about love, just as Christmas seems to have become a symbol for our unconsciousness about what Christian theology refers to as the Incarnation. Valentine’s Day, with its consumerist sea of plastic reds, whites and pinks, heartshaped everythings, chocolates, flowers and cards, makes love seem like a commodity. Restaurants and hotels are booked ahead of time, condom sales skyrocket, and so, it turns out, does the likelihood of unplanned pregnancies.

But apart from and in spite of all of this commodity fetishism, Valentine’s Day can also be taken to reflect a deep collective trust that, as Virgil reminds us, “amor vincit omnia“; most of us (if such a generalisation can be allowed) really do hope that love wins. Or, to put it differently, we want to believe, as St. Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians intimates, that “love never fails”. The Pidgin’ English bible puts the same idea this way: “Wen you get love an aloha, dat no goin pau eva!” (1 Cor 13.8). If that doesn’t put a smile on your face, I’m not sure if anything can.


But, what does this no-goin-pau-eva even mean? I suppose I could go on for a while about this most sublime of subjects, because it is so very, very crucial to any hope we have of experiencing the best that existence has to offer, but I just want to mention a few ideas that have made me think of love differently, starting with the rather esoteric notion of tzimtzum. 


Tzimtzum, from the Kabbalist tradition, is the notion that when God began the process of creating everything that we perceive, he had to contract or constrict his own being. “In order to create,” the mystic philosopher Simone Weil suggests, “God had to hide himself; otherwise, there would be nothing but God.” There is a paradox here if we think about the Johannine expression of God as being love in his very nature (1 John 4.8), because it suggests that God (the All) is precisely the being who recedes in order that other things can live, breathe and have presence (i.e. God becomes, by choice and activity, the Not-All-who-could-be-All-and-therefore-is-All).


Even if you stick with atheism, the idea of tzimtzum is still beautiful: the ultimate No-Thing, as the Hasidic mystics sometimes call God, recedes into almost-absence in order that the existence of things is made possible. In fact, if you like playing with concepts the way that I do, you may even conclude that atheism may be taken as a kind of symbol of this very notion: the atheist believes so strongly in divine contraction that the divine is no longer an overt feature of her horizon of understanding. Although, of course, logically speaking we must acknowledge that hiddenness is not necessarily a sign of nonbeing. I’m aware that there are nonetheless forms of atheism that would be less than amicable towards this idea.


Still, this tzimtzum is the kind of idea that can “break your brain” (to quote my students) if you think about it too long. To me it’s a profound image for what it means to love another human being: to love well, to truly love, we must recede, step back. The ego must contract. We must enter into that hilarious self-forgetfulness — the same kind of self-forgetfulness that allows us to revel in a good joke or marvel at a profound work of art. We must open up a space for the other person to be, to breathe and be recognized for who they are rather than just what they can do for us.


This brings me to the second conception of love: love as agápē (ἀγάπη), which is the word used by St. Paul to describe love in his famous passage from 1 Corinthians 13 mentioned above — arguably the most beautiful passage ever written on love. It means the kind of love that we know best as a pure gift. It is not given on the basis of any kind of obligation or transaction or law; it is never deserved, owed or owned. Rather, it is a kind of exuberant, riotous love that sees a need and fills it, no matter what has happened or what will happen as a consequence. This agapeic love rescues us from that undiluted erotic love that fuels Hollywood’s terrible Romantic comedy/drama narrative engine; that erotic love which on its own and left to itself is not so much concerned with the meeting of the self and the other as it is with the consumption of the other by the self. Eros tends to lurch forward out of a sense of privation or lack; agápē is an overflow.

Which brings me, lastly and most briefly, to the wonderful definition of love offered by Alain Badiou. Love, for him, is co-subjectivity. It is not a mono-subjectivity — a one-perspective thing — but is that which arises out of the dance between selves and others. The idea here is that the kind of love that fails to see the other is not really love at all. Only God can endlessly recede (as in tzimtzum) or endlessly give (as in agápē) — Only God can be both the No-Thing and the All-Thing, but our human experience tells us that we, as incomplete and finite beings, recognise love only in reciprocity: in mutual recognition. This view of love tells us that we are not individuals but interdividuals, born and raised to relate to the world and others in it.


This is not to give any weight to the disastrous and false Hollywood phrase “You complete me.” Love, if anything, is the assumption that the other is there, not to complete the self, but to be celebrated for herself. Love, if anything, reminds us that we are ontologically interdependent. “You incomplete me” would be a more accurate way of describing what love does: it places us always in awe and in debt. And yet, there is another paradox (because there always is another paradox) and it is this: when we contract, and give and recognise our incompleteness, we find ourselves filled; in being confronted with our own diminishing (tzimtzum), we find ourselves given over to and even capable of abundance (agápē). In this genuine love, our entire perception of reality is transformed; even lack becomes bountiful. The great mystic Rumi puts it well, “With thee, my love, hell itself were heaven; With thee a prison would be a rose garden."


(Originally published on 16 February, 2015)

The hammer and the nail: A lenten reflection

A nail that sticks out will be hammered down. The basic idea of this Japanese proverb is that the person who stands out in any way is going to be pummeled back into place, usually by a crowd who cannot handle any kind of nonconformity. It’s the kind of idea that reinforces Kierkegaard’s contention that the “crowd is the lie” because in the end the central impetus of the hammer is not truth at all, but uniformity and conformity, which apart from truth are ultimately a kind of deformity.

Of course, the proverb can be taken as a complement alongside another Japanese proverb, which says that envy is the companion of honour: if you stand out you’re bound to be met with criticism and resistance; and some of that criticism and resistance may be thoroughly unpleasant, or even violent. But this is ultimately not because you’re simply a loser in the eyes of the critics. Rather, the chances are that you’re on the side of the extraordinary. You’re doing something few others would dare to do. The hammer tries to degrade the nail because it finds the nail threatening.


This is not to say that the hammer that comes down on the nail is always wrong. Criminals who get punished for crimes have been met with the hammer of justice precisely because they have stepped outide of what is legal. The hammer in this instance can be very right, unless the law is wrong that is. And, yes, the law can be wrong. This is why we must call the law into question as often as we can, not to rebel against it but to check that it still serves justice. Nevertheless, it is not this kind of critical, careful legal hammering that I am primarily concerned with here. My concern is with the kind of hammer that comes down unreasonably, hastily, angrily and vindictively. This is the kind of hammering I have a problem with.


And to help to express my problem with this kind of hammering, I have my own proverb to go with the original Japanese proverb above: The hammer usually misses the nail. What I mean is not that the critics of the nail sticking out don’t wound their target, for there are a great many people who have been deeply wounded by blow of the hammer. Rather, what I mean is that the criticism — that is, hot, violent, hasty criticism — is so often misplaced. It doesn’t hit the nail on the head. Again, I’m not talking about deliberate, careful or thoughtful criticism here. Unthinking criticism misses the most fundamental fact of the nail’s sticking out. It’s actually not about a moral position or even one person’s rightness and another’s wrongness. It’s just about the fact that the nail is sticking out; that it is not, by definition, on the side of the hammer. That is all. That is why the hammer (the untruth of the crowd) misses the nail (the truth of the individual human subject).


Most of all, my point here is that people’s biases and reactions mostly have very little to do with some or other so-called rationality or reasonability. People’s biases, especially their in-group/out-group biases, are simply driven my mimetic desire: that shared desire that, in collective flashes of automatic mirror neurons, brings people together. It’s not generally about what is better or worse, but about allegiance and that age-old mimetic question: Are you with us or against us? If we fail to see the mimetic drive of the crowd, we are likely to get caught up in it; we are likely to live in the untruth of the way of the hammer.


One philosopher who came so close to recognizing the untruth of the hammer was a philosopher who used the hammer (albeit the literal one this time) as his primary example for how we live in the world. Martin Heidegger, in Being and Time, said that normally we have a posture towards things that is ready-to-hand rather than present-at-hand. What he meant was that in picking up the hammer, we do so with a kind of ready sense of what it is for and how it is used. We are not, in other words, concentrating on its presence and its hammerish attributes — it’s handle and the metal bit at the top. But this same Heidegger, who recognized this ready-to-hand quality of our posture towards being, saw the untruth of the crowd as something utterly removed from the experience of the individual so much so that he saw the crowd as the quintessential example of living unauthentically. Nevertheless, failing to see that he too could be influenced by the crowd, he embraced, to an alarming degree, the ideology of Germany’s Nazi party. He failed to see all the ways that the hammer was actually broken.


But, alas, the failure of people to see the mimetic nature of crowds and their tendency to fall in unthinkingly with the grove of the masses is as common today as it was back then. There will be millions of examples out there from every corner of the globe, every tribe, religion and language; but I thought I’d pick one out that suits the season of Lent (in the Christian calendar) that we are now in. It will probably a contentious example for many of my religious, evangelical Christian friends, but that is precisely what makes it a helpful example. Just a week or two ago, the author Rob Bell when discussing a book that he and his wife Kristen had written with Oprah Winfrey, claimed that he thinks that the Christian Church is moments away from embracing gay marriage.


The liberals must have cheered, but the conservatives cringed before proceeding to freak the hell out about Bell’s audacity and (so-called) heresy. Never before, by the way, has this kind of sexual politics been a matter of religious orthodoxy in this way. Anyway, I don’t know how it happened that I got there — I think someone posted a link on Facebook — but I visited the site of a particular Christian magazine and the labels that were thrown at Bell in the comments section were fairly astonishing. He was called a false prophet more times than I could count, as well as an apostate and even servant of Satan. The first thing that occurred to me was that Bell is in good company. The Jesus that Bell aligns himself with was criticised, among other things, for being a drunkard, blasphemer, friend of reprobates, and a prophet in league with the devil (Luke 5.21, 7.34, 11.15). 


Actually, Bell has gotten off rather lightly, I think, if you think of what Jesus went through. One of the great culprits in this massive upheaval is found in what can be called commonsense morality. What I mean is that all of us have a sense, based on where we come from, of what is obviously right. But that doesn’t mean we have good or even legitimate reason for thinking so (“The bible tells me so” is not a reason, by the way, just an appeal to an authority that happens also to be throughly complex and even confusing, as those who have actually read it will understand). Still, the main culprit is not what people think but how they interact, always caught in the vortex of mimetic desire.


I have no doubt that there are some responses to Bell worth looking at somewhere on the internet, but they were not to be found in that article or in the comments that followed. It was all just anger and fury, hellfire and brimstone. No one on that forum asked how Bell, as a guy with quite impressive theological training and who openly affirms the truth of every item on the Apostle’s creed, as well as many other aspects of orthodox Christianity, could arrive at a conclusion that challenges a norm that people hold as somehow sacred. No one stopped to wonder if same sex relationships are really as big a deal in the Christian bible as people are making it out to be (they’re not) or if the kind of same sex relationships written about in the bible are precisely what we have today (again, they’re really not, if you take historical context seriously). No one in the mob did their homework, because that’s not what mobs do. They just jumped in and hurled insults and hatred at a man who, to me at least, seems like a pretty decent guy; a guy who comes across as thoroughly kind and generous-spirited even when he is being attacked so viciously by people who call themselves Christians. The hammer just came down because a nail happened to be sticking out. And, of course, as it so often does, the hammer missed completely.


It missed something that is so fundamental that it’s actually surprising just how often it is overlooked: that the central and most important contribution of Christian theology to ethics in general in the world today is its stance against the mindless, angry mob. Christianity, if it is to be read through the teachings of the figure at the centre of its epistemology, must be understood as a critique of the hammer. As a corollary, it is also a defense of the nail that has found itself sticking out. Whenever Jesus is confronted with a mob, he resists the urge to join in their hammering, even when that means utterly contravening the laws that they believe in. Take, for instance, John 8, which describes a scene in which a bunch of people are about to execute a woman by stoning because she had been caught in adultery. What people tend to overlook is that there is no precedent in the entire Jewish law that would allow him to step out in the way that he did (see Deuteronomy 22.22 and Leviticus 20.10). As far as the law was concerned, forgiveness was only reserved for minor offenses, not major ones like adultery. But here Jesus quite brazenly broke the law. He effectively, actively, denounced some of what the bible agrees with. (See, I told you, “The bible tells me so” isn’t an argument; the bible is, quite deliberately so, not a monolithic text).


In the process of dealing with that mob in John 8, Jesus says something pretty impressive. He says, “The person who is without sin should be the one to cast the first stone”. Now, it looks on the surface to be a fairly simple thing to say, but it’s really ingenious. In essence, he forces each person present to step outside of their mob mimeticism and their hive-mind stoning mentality and examine themselves as individuals. And the result is: no one can cast the first stone. Because they all realize that they, too, are far from perfect. You see, in that culture, one sin was not worse than another. Every sin — Francis Spufford in his amazing book Unapologetic: Why Christianity Still Makes Emotional Sense defines sin so accurately and colourfully as the “Human Propensity to Fuck Things Up” — every sin was an indication of being disconnected from Goodness Itself, which was condemnation enough. In that moment that Jesus calls everyone to be present to themselves, they are forced to think of themselves outside the hammer of culture, as individual nails. And in that moment, there is peace. Mob violence is averted.


But the thing is, it wasn’t a peace that would last for the Prince of Peace. Because Jesus did this sort of extremely bold thing so often that he stuck out a little too much. Actually, he stuck out a lot. And the result, we know, was his crucifixion. The hammer wanted a few nails to hammer down, so it did this right through his wrists and feet after one of the most brutal torturing sessions recorded in history. If there is powerful and significant critique against mimetic violence (even in its verbal and symbolic forms), or any kind of mob aggression, like the kind that has ganged up against people like Rob Bell or the gay people he is defending, it is must be the crucifixion of Jesus. The story makes it obvious: an innocent man is put to death because he sticks out, not because he is wrong. In fact, again, his guilt or innocence on the crimes he is accused of have nothing to do with his execution. He is killed by a mob because he is on the side of the minority.


Jesus said some words that discredit pretty much every person who buys into the mob mentality that picks on one person in the name of the crowd. Jesus said that people will know who his disciples are by the way they love each other. He certainly didn’t say that they’ll know who his disciples are by their perfect adherence to heteronormativity. And, anyway, this is the same man who said that we should love our enemies; that is, we should love even those who don’t fit with our agenda. That sort of wisdom, to me, seems sorely needed today, especially by those who think that the point of believing in the Transcendent is to have some big Other (to borrow Lacan’s name for that false god who is really just a projection of human legalism) to support their own expanding egos. To me it seems that this season of Lent is about something else. It’s about the fact that the Transcendent is the absence of ego, the denial of self and even a surrender. It is a surrender that is expressed in simple actions like giving up chocolate or coffee or some digital addiction; the Divine affects, by definition, a glorious, loving, life-giving freedom from the lie of the crowd. But it does this by revealing the truth of our natural imitation of the desires of others. In other words, freedom from the crowd arrives only in the paradox of seeing that we are the hammer and those who disagree with us may be our next victim-nails. It is only when we discover how we have been complicit in the crowd, that we are free to genuinely love and care for those who have been shunned by the crowd.

The failure of categories

Marlo Thomas has said, “There are two kinds of people in the world, givers and takers. The takers may eat better, but the givers sleep better”. Indira Gandhi offers a different categorisation, “There are two kinds of people: those who do the work and those who take the credit”. C. S. Lewis has yet another idea, namely that the two kinds of people include “those who say to God, ‘Thy will be done,’ and those to whom God says, ‘All right, then, have it your way’.” We could go on, of course, by noting that there are those who love to talk a lot and those who dislike people who love to talk a lot, or those who love to get up in the morning and those who think camels are one hump short; or those who think in binary and those who don’t know what binary is.

Perhaps there will be cases in which this obsession with endlessly splitting people up into dichotomies will be true. For the Heideggerian, there is the authentic self or the untruth of the crowd; for the Girardian, there are victims or victimisers (“Whoever can supply [the crowd] with illusions is easily their master. Whoever attempts to destroy their illusions is always their victim,” Gustav Le Bon has said); with regard to Ayn Rand, there are those who like her work and then those who are actually intelligent enough to see it for the stupid bunkum that it is. Still, we must feel on some level that there is also falsity here in this game of short division. I like Tom Robbins’s ironic quip in Still Life with Woodpecker that “[t]here are two kinds of people in this world: Those who believe there are two kinds of people in this world and those who are smart enough to know better”.


The father of public relations, Edward Bernays in his brilliant and somewhat unsettling book Crystallizing Public Opinion (1923) writes:

“Society is not divided into two groups, although it seems so to many. Some see modern society divided into capital and labor. The feminist sees the world divided into men and women. The hungry man sees the rich and the poor. The missionary sees the heathen and the faithful. If society were divided into two groups, and no more, then change would come about only through violent upheaval.”
It is a brilliant observation that I think highlights so perfectly the nature of ideology: it is that which tends to split up and divide things as a means for control. Ideologists conceive of the world through stark contrasts even when they must surely know that their perceptions are limited; can they not see that there are not just shades of grey but colours of all kinds that also need to be taken into account? Nevertheless, for reasons that I’m not entirely clear on, nuance is usually the first thing to go when ideas crystallize into articulations. “Tyranny,” Albert Maysles suggests, “is the deliberate removal of nuance”. Perhaps, though, any removal of nuance is tyrannical and not just the deliberate kind.
As soon as you divide people up into two groups, and set up clear distinctions that suggest that there really are only two kinds of people, you have (as Bernays has noted) violence, or at least the conditions for violence. And if you, like me, are not a fan of violence, then it may be worthwhile understanding how crowds come to view things in such sharp, contrasting terms. I’m not sure I can solve the riddle completely, but I have a simple suggestion: I think it has to do with the fact that calling attention to anything forces that thing to become a kind of absolute (or stereotype) in the minds of the people of any audience. There are a number of cognitive biases at work here: the ambiguity affect, the availability cascade, the contrast effect, the distinction bias, essentialism, the focusing effect, as well as a number of others. The main point is this: every emphasis is an overemphasis. Take the last sentence as a case in point.

I think it’s the job of sane and sensitive souls to utterly refuse any trend towards reductionism. This, mind you, is not an easy thing to do. Still, perhaps a good place to start is by assuming, right off the bat, that every label we’ve ever used to describe ourselves or someone else is automatically wrong because of what it emphasises and therefore overemphasises. We should be aware of what the French philosopher Alain Badiou calls the problem of “nominal occlusions”, which causes one term or name in a truth procedure to occlude and thereby possibly even obliterate another. When calling a person gay or straight, you define them by their sexuality only and thus fail to account for them as people. When you refer to them by their political allegiances, you neglect their personal affections and non-political agendas; when you delineate their being strictly along the lines of their faith or epistemological claims, you neglect all kinds of other things that are too subtle to even mention. When we dish labels out too confidently, we fall into the trap of thinking that our conscious articulations fully account for who we are. Because every assertion is a diversion.


This is why I find the promotion of a loss of identity in Christian theology fascinating, which most Christians I know don’t take seriously at all. It is only by losing your self, that is by losing your commitment to strict labels and rigid articulations, that you are free to be fully human. St. Paul, in his letter to the Galatians, sets up a fairly brilliant and subversive delineation that I find quite helpful: he says that those “in Christ”, that is, who participate in the way of self-abnegation and the acceptance of the pure Grace of Divine Presence (Pure Gift, Pure Surprise), are “neither Jew (religious insider), nor Gentile (religious outsider), nor slave nor free; nor is there male and female” (Galatians 3.28). It’s not that these categories cease to exist, but rather that they are not ultimately what defines people. In fact, people cannot be defined at all. We have, today, other labels that we may want to apply this: there is neither atheist nor theist, Christian nor Muslim, Protestant nor Catholic, Calvinist nor Methodist, gay nor straight, elite nor mob, capitalist nor communist, etc. These are not the terms that define anyone. They are the terms that really only fictionalise reality and turn it into something utterly palatable. But reality is not palatable or easily digested. It arrests and it undermines. It gets under our skin. It is our skin.


Surprisingly, this double-negation — neither this nor that — is not a negation of labels in the end, but in fact is a deeper affirmation of them as limited markers of what is real and true. There are indeed men but they are not just men, and there are women but their womanhood is not the sum total of who they are. There are feminists and chauvinists, but they are people first. The problem with affirming the label without also negating it too is that that loving embrace of inclusion itself so easily gets excluded. Violence, whether real or symbolic, becomes the norm in the process. Of course, I think we should recognise that categorisations are good as pathways but we should simultaneously see that they are absolutely rubbish as judgments. Categories as judgments are, in their own dualistic way, a kind of violence against ourselves and others when we take them more seriously than the complex and multifaceted realities that they are trying so hard to refer to.

Followers